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ABSTRACT 
One of the significant challenges for reforming the intelligence agencies in 
consolidating democracies is to develop an intelligence culture that understands and 
supports the role of intelligence and establishes trust with the civil society after an 
authoritarian past. Building on the existing literature, as well as the practices of 
Spain, Romania, and Tunisia, this thesis identifies a conceptual framework that 
a consolidating democracy can use to develop an intelligence culture that is supportive 
of its intelligence organizations, roles, and practices. This model identifies four main 
vital factors that need to be addressed before commencing the intelligence culture 
reform process. These factors are the perception of society as a whole, external 
support, the threat environment, and the political elites’ knowledge and expertise. 
Furthermore, this model emphasizes the political elites’ central role in leading a 
collective institutional effort in order to achieve a consistent and balanced trade-off 
between the democratic values of the intelligence community and maintaining 
intelligence effectiveness. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
All democracies create intelligence services to gather information on friends and 
enemies, making threat and security assessments, and providing timely and tailored 
intelligence to the decision-makers, in support of national security. This task is more 
challenging for developing democracies,1 whose population and policymakers usually 
mistrust and even hate intelligence because of the oppressive conduct of the intelligence 
agencies during the previous non-democratic regime, which makes democratic reform of 
intelligence difficult.2 Indeed, the citizens in new democracies resent and oppose creating 
effective intelligence agencies out of fear of a return to the powerful and abusive intelligence 
services of the past, even as intelligence agencies resist and oppose transparency and 
accountability.3 Developing democracies, then, undergo a vicious cycle of lack of public 
trust in intelligence and resistance to reform. In other words, according to Thomas Bruneau 
and Cristiana Matei, they lack a culture of intelligence—both inside and outside the 
intelligence organizations—that understands and supports the role of intelligence in a 
democracy.4 Breaking this cycle involves, among other endeavors, raising public awareness 
of the need for capable intelligence agencies in a democratic system, and creating 
professional intelligence agencies in service of all their citizens and not just a few. This task 
is rather difficult because, in new democracies, political elites lack knowledge aboutand 
1 Developing or consolidating democracies (sometimes referred to as new democracies, too) are 
defined as countries that underwent a successful transition from a non-democratic regime to a democracy, 
and are endeavoring to develop five arenas that Linz and Stepan equate to democratic consolidation: free 
and lively civil society, autonomous and valued political society, rule of law, usable state bureaucracy, and 
institutionalized economic society. Juan J. Linz, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: 
Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1996), 7. 
2 For more information on the public opinion on intelligence in new democracies, see Florina Cristiana 
Matei and Carolyn Halladay, eds., The Conduct of Intelligence in Democracies: Processes, Practices, 
Cultures (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc, 2019); Florina Cristiana Matei and Thomas C. 
Bruneau, “Policymakers and Intelligence Reform in the New Democracies,” International Journal of 
Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 24, no. 4 (2011): 656–91; Florina Cristiana Matei and Thomas 
Bruneau, “Intelligence Reform in New Democracies: Factors Supporting or Arresting Progress,” 
Democratization 18, no. 3 (June 2011): 602–30, https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2011.586257. 
3 Matei and Halladay, The Conduct of Intelligence in Democracies. 
4 Matei and Bruneau, “Intelligence Reform in New Democracies.” 
2 
interest inintelligence reforms. Intelligence agencies lack vigorous public affairs and 
outreach programs to build trust in intelligence among the population, while the intelligence-
averse media refuses to act as a bridge between intelligence services and civil society.5 
Unsurprisingly, then, only a few new democracies, including Spain and Romania, have been 
successful in developing a post-authoritarian intelligence culture.6 Othersincluding 
Greece, Portugal, Brazil, and Tunisia, to name a few—are still struggling to foster an 
intelligence culture. In this context, the focus of this research is to identify the most suitable 
methods and processes for institutionalizing an intelligence culture in support of democratic 
intelligence in new democracies. 
 MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis attempts to answer the following questions: why and how should a 
consolidating democracy develop an intelligence culture that is supportive of its intelligence 
organizations, roles, and practices? What conceptual framework for intelligence culture 
should a consolidating democracy use? 
 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Developing an intelligence culture in consolidating democracies is cardinal in 
establishing and maintaining the legitimacy of intelligence agencies. Without legitimate 
intelligence agencies, the democratic transition of the state will be vulnerable to setbacks and 
reverse democratization efforts, resulting from the vicious cycle of public mistrust in 
intelligence and resistance to democratization on the part of intelligence agencies.  
In this context, this thesis is important to governments of new democracies who are 
attempting to reform their intelligence agencies—from institutions that supported non-
democratic regimes and acted against their citizens to democratic services that safeguard 
national security and democracy—which represents a challenging endeavor. This thesis can 
provide the policymakers in these democracies with a framework that they can use to 
                                                 
5 Matei and Bruneau, 613. 
6 Matei and Halladay, The Conduct of Intelligence in Democracies, 213–26. 
3 
institutionalize an intelligence culture and break down the barrier between public distrust in 
intelligence and intelligence reform.  
This thesis is also important for collective regional and international security efforts. 
The new complex and dynamic global threat environment calls for collective efforts to 
combat successfully both traditional (e.g., armed conflicts) and non-traditional (e.g., 
terrorism, organized crime, and the like) threats. Subsequently, an intelligence culture that is 
supportive of effective intelligence agencies in a democratic environment is critical for the 
newly transitioning democracies.  
This investigation is also important to the U.S. government, which has long been 
providing security assistance and security cooperation to new democracies, and which will 
benefit from an overview of the challenges (and recipes for success) of institutionalizing an 
intelligence culture in new democracies. Additionally, as the United States has continuous 
interest in incorporating as many nations as possible in its security and intelligence efforts to 
ensure a global collective approach for information sharing and threat assessments, aligning 
with similarly-minded nations who adopt similar democratic intelligence cultures and 
practices is highly vital. 
 LITERATURE REVIEW  
The purpose of this literature review is to provide an overview of the leading 
scholarly debates on what defines intelligence culture and what democracies need to do in 
order to achieve a culture of intelligence. Specifically, this literature review analyzes the 
academic works focused on conceptualizing intelligence culture, defining intelligence 
culture, and identifying successful intelligence culture processes.  
Although intelligence is an old concept and profession, the concept of intelligence 
culture is relatively new; Philip Murphy arbitrates the idea of British commonwealth 
intelligence culture during the Cold War.7 Moreover, with few exceptions, most of the 
available literature is based on the works of American and British scholars, who identified 
                                                 
7 Philip Murphy, “Creating a Commonwealth Intelligence Culture: The View from Central Africa 
1945–1965,” Intelligence and National Security 17, no. 3 (September 2002): 131–62, https://doi.org/
10.1080/02684520412331306580. 
4 
specific definitions and conceptual frameworks and models surrounding the concept of 
intelligence culture based on the Anglo-Saxon intelligence framework and practices.  
1. Conceptualizing Intelligence Culture 
A distinct corpus of literature attempts to conceptualize intelligence culture as a 
subset of the concept of culture.8 Indeed, Davies reveals the conceptional dominance of 
culture over the national intelligence and security institutions and policy fields.9 Davies 
further argues that intelligence culture is also needed to explain how intelligence functions 
and fails while performing a similar set of tasks in different countries.10 He uses the example 
of the British and U.S. intelligence services’ cultural norms to illustrate the causal effect of 
culture on some of their intelligence failures, more recently the faulty U.S. assessment of the 
Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program, which led to the 2003 invasion of 
Iraq.11 Davies identifies the U.S. intelligence culture of rivalry and turf wars, as well as the 
British intelligence culture of subordinating to the quantitative mass of the overt government, 
as causal factors for the intelligence failures to correctly assess the status of the Iraqi WMD 
program.12 Murphy takes this argument further by emphasizing the role of the British 
commonwealth intelligence culture in undermining the allied nations’ intelligence services’ 
authority and their social effectiveness.13 Murphy explains that, while sharing the same 
intelligence culture among different commonwealth intelligence services is of great value for 
the British intelligence community, competent commonwealth intelligence partners need to 
gain and maintain their governments’ trust through demonstrating their uncontested loyalty 
                                                 
8“The Oxford English Dictionary defines culture as the philosophy, practice, and attitudes of an 
institution, business, or other organization.” Mark Phythian, “Cultures of National Intelligence,” in 
Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies (London: Routledge, 2013), 33, https://doi.org/10.4324/
9780203762721.ch3. 
9 Philip H.J. Davies, “Intelligence Culture and Intelligence Failure in Britain and the United States,” 





13 Murphy, “Creating a Commonwealth Intelligence Culture,” 157. 
5 
to their national leaders and not their British intelligence masters.14 Richard Aldrich and 
John Kasuku agree with these scholars, further stressing that intelligence culture is driven by 
the intelligence communities’ sense of their countries’ national strategies.15 Aldrich and 
Kasuku explain that intelligence culture is intertwined with the norms and values, and the 
unique national strategy and challenges, for each nation.16 On the same note, Mark Phythian 
suggests that strategic studies and intelligence culture intertwine because of the commonality 
of their concerns.17 Pythian further posits that the intelligence culture affects and is affected 
by political culture, due to the inward and outward nature of intelligence and its inherent 
relationship with policymakers, and the emergence of the oversight principle as a cultural 
norm in both political and intelligence cultures.18  
Another group of scholars links intelligence culture with the threat environment.19 
For example, Satgin Hamrah reveals that the Cold War intelligence culture was focused on 
the “need-to-know” concept, with excessive compartmentalization, and that while this 
culture might have been valid for that period’s threat-related characteristics, it is not 
necessarily valid today in a collaborative and cooperative “need-to-share”-based intelligence 
environment.20 He argues that “it is essential to develop and implement a cultural strategy 
and methods of operation that coincide with the current threat environment.”21 Hamrah 
examines the results of both 9/11 and the Iraqi WMD Commissions and uses their findings 
as an example of an intelligence failure that happened due to an intelligence culture that 
                                                 
14 Murphy, 157 
15 Richard J. Aldrich and John Kasuku, “Escaping from American Intelligence: Culture, 
Ethnocentrism and the Anglosphere,” International Affairs 88, no. 5 (September 2012): 1009–28, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2012.01116.x. 
16 Aldrich and Kasuku, 1028. 
17 Phythian, “Cultures of National Intelligence,” 34. 
18 Phythian, 34 
19 Lauri Holmstrom, “Intelligence Culture, Economic Espionage, and the Finnish Security Intelligence 
Service,” n.d., 21; Satgin Hamrah, “The Role of Culture in Intelligence Reform,” Journal of Strategic 
Security 6, no. 3 Suppl (September 2013): 160–71, https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.6.3S.17; Davies, 
“Intelligence Culture and Intelligence Failure in Britain and the United States.” 
20 Hamrah, “The Role of Culture in Intelligence Reform,” 162. 
21 Hamrah, 162. 
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lacked the ability and the willingness to adapt to a new threat environment, and thus share 
information and collaborate with other national security agencies.22 Philip Davies agrees and 
advances the concept of collegiality culture to address intelligence failures within both the 
British and U.S. intelligence agencies.23 Davies argues that both the British and the 
American intelligence systemswhich lack this collegiality culture—are conceptually 
diverging due to intelligence culture rather than institutional reasons.24 To sum up, 
intelligence culture is a dynamic concept which actively updates the norms and values of the 
intelligence community in response to the threat environment. 
Another body of literature explains intelligence culture through the lens of other types 
of political culture.25 Irena Chiru explains that the relation between political and intelligence 
cultures is based on the intelligence convergence with political culture under the notion that 
“cultural beliefs and values shaping a given society’s orientation toward politics.”26 She 
defines the concept of political culture as “an environment that included those attitudes and 
practices that shape people’s political behaviors, but also the myths, moral judgments, 
beliefs, and ideas about what makes ‘a good society’.”27 She continues to explain that 
“political culture studies focus on the deep-rooted, built-in variables characteristic of a 
society or group, those features that filter perceptions, impact attitudes, and determine 
decisions and behaviors.”28 Mark Phythian agrees that intelligence culture is influenced by, 
and interacts with, the greater political culture.29 Phythian adds that the factors which 
influence and affect political culture in a particular nation have subsequent similar effects on 
                                                 
22 Hamrah, “The Role of Culture in Intelligence Reform.” 
23 Davies, “Intelligence Culture and Intelligence Failure in Britain and the United States.” 
24 Davies. 
25 Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, “Intelligence in the Developing Democracies: The 
Quest for Transparency and Effectiveness,” in The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence, ed. 
Loch K. Johnson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 756–73, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/
9780195375886.003.0045; Phythian, “Cultures of National Intelligence”; Matei and Halladay, The Conduct 
of Intelligence in Democracies. 
26 Matei and Halladay, The Conduct of Intelligence in Democracies, 214. 
27 Matei and Halladay, 214. 
28 Matei and Halladay, 214. 
29 Phythian, “Cultures of National Intelligence,” 40. 
7 
intelligence culture, like oversight norms and secrecy, especially in democratic political 
systems.30 Phythian adds that “the simultaneously inward- and outward-facing nature of 
intelligence means that it impacts more directly on the political culture.”31 Bruneau and 
Matei also agree with the notion that political culture intersects with intelligence culture and 
explains that political culture is critical to understanding and achieving intelligence culture 
reforms within developing democracies.32 In sum, political culture has a direct effect on 
intelligence culture. The intelligence community norms and values of what is considered 
right or wrong have to satisfy the intelligence agencies’ political masters. Intelligence 
services’ pursuit of political legitimacy and sponsorship makes political culture of great 
importance for developing the intelligence culture.  
Other scholars consider intelligence culture an element related to the higher strategic 
culture.33 In this connection, Aldrich and Kasuku point out that “if states have strategic 
cultures then they most likely also have related intelligence culture.”34 On the same note, 
Phythian emphasizes that “intelligence studies and strategic studies have concerns in 
common, and that the idea of culture is recognised now as being central to the study of 
strategy, strategic studies seems an obvious starting point when considering what the 
comparative study of intelligence cultures should include.”35 Chiru further explains that 
intelligence and strategic culture concepts are conceptually connected to the debate of the 
organizational culture, and the different explanations of what intelligence exactly means.36 
Hamilton Bean agrees with Chiru and uses organizational and intelligence culture concepts 
interchangeably in his argument regarding the U.S. intelligence failures during the 9/11 
terrorist attacks. Bean suggests that the CIA officials ambiguously used culture to manipulate 
                                                 
30 Phythian, “Cultures of National Intelligence.” 
31 Phythian, 40. 
32 Bruneau and Matei, “Intelligence in the Developing Democracies,” 766. 
33 Matei and Halladay, The Conduct of Intelligence in Democracies. 
34 Aldrich and Kasuku, “Escaping from American Intelligence,” 1014. 
35 Phythian, “Cultures of National Intelligence,” 34. 
36 Matei and Halladay, The Conduct of Intelligence in Democracies. 
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the causes of intelligence failures and avoid accountability.37 In addition, both Hamrah and 
Bean agree that the organization culture could lead to either success or failure in the 
intelligence organization.38 Hamrah also identifies the interchangeable use of organizational 
and intelligence culture in his effort to address behavior patterns and mechanisms needed to 
foster better collaboration and information sharing.39 By the same token, Lauri Holmstrom 
explains that the “organizational culture solves the basic problems of survival and adaptation 
that an agency faces in its external operational environment.”40 In sum, intelligence culture 
is strongly related to other types of culture. Within this context, scholars have attempted to 
come up with a definition of intelligence culture, which takes us to the next body of literature.  
2. Defining Intelligence Culture 
A different body of literature has attempted to define intelligence culture. Isabelle 
Duyvesteyn, Chiru, and Phythian all reach a consensus to use Jack Snyder’s definition of 
strategic culture as a springboard to defining intelligence culture.41 In Snyder’s view, 
strategic culture is “The total sum of ideals, conditional emotional responses, and patterns of 
habitual behavior that members of a national strategic community have acquired through 
instruction or imitation and that they share with each other with regard to [nuclear] 
strategy.”42 Subsequently, Phythian’s definition of intelligence culture is “The ideas, 
responses, and behaviors acquired by intelligence communities and conditioned by history 
and geography.”43 Phythian also notes that when intelligence agencies maintain a culture of 
                                                 
37 Hamilton Bean, “Organizational Culture and U.S. Intelligence Affairs,” Intelligence and National 
Security 24, no. 4 (August 2009): 485, https://doi.org/10.1080/02684520903069413. 
38 Hamrah, “The Role of Culture in Intelligence Reform”; Bean, “Organizational Culture and U.S. 
Intelligence Affairs.” 
39 Hamrah, “The Role of Culture in Intelligence Reform.” 
40 Holmstrom, “Intelligence Culture, Economic Espionage, and the Finnish Security Intelligence 
Service,” 274. 
41 Isabelle Duyvesteyn, “Intelligence and Strategic Culture: Some Observations,” Intelligence and 
National Security 26, no. 4 (August 2011): 521–30, https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2011.580605; 
Phythian, “Cultures of National Intelligence”; Irena Chiru, “National Intelligence Cultures,” in The 
Conduct of Intelligence in Democracies: Processes, Practices, Cultures, ed. Florina Matei and Carolyn 
Halladay (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc, 2019), 213–28. 
42 Chiru, “National Intelligence Cultures,” 215. 
43 Phythian, “Cultures of National Intelligence,” 34. 
9 
a high degree of secrecy to the level where secrecy disrupts the oversight process, the political 
culture of that nation will be adversely influenced by the intelligence community’s lack of 
accountability.44 
Similarly, Chiru uses a multilevel model of analysis of intelligence culture to define 
it as “a mix of information, values, perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors related to 
intelligence, from within both intelligence insiders and outsiders, shaped by historical 
context, the geopolitics, and the collective mentality of the imagined community of the 
nation.45 This model reveals the interaction between intelligence culture and the political 
and public spheres within a broader historical and geopolitical context, using both 
intelligence insiders’ and outsiders’ perceptions of intelligence behaviors.46 This multilevel 
model emphasizes the public sphere perceptions of intelligence actions as a tool to identify 
the lens through which the society’s collective memory and views are formed.47 Moreover, 
this approach emphasizes that social perceptions of the past are essential for understanding 
the processes of intelligence culture reform, and will define how transitioning democracies 
conceptually identify their own identity, values, and boundaries. The consensus in the 
literature is that the definition of intelligence culture should include, on one hand, intelligence 
community values and behaviors both at the organizational and practitioner levels, and the 
public and political perceptions of intelligence norms and actions within a broader historical 
and geopolitical context on the other.  
3. Identifying Successful Intelligence Culture Processes 
A group of scholars has attempted to provide a roadmap for intelligence reforms. 
Such reforms were aimed at developing effective intelligence cultures in democracies. For 
example, Aldrich and Kasuku assert that intelligence culture requires intelligence services to 
have “clear mandates provided by legislation, and also central coordination, together with 
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both judicial oversight and parliamentary accountability.”48 Claudia Hillebrand agrees and 
adds that, “to juggle the democratic demands of the public and the effectiveness of the 
intelligence sector’s activities, oversight institutions and mechanisms were set up in order to 
scrutinise and ‘check’ intelligence services and their work.”49 This delicate balance of 
acquiring democratic intelligence values, and maintaining effective intelligence functions, is 
crucial for the states’ survival and successful democratic transition. Hillebrand identifies 
oversight as “a process of superintendence of the agencies that is concerned not with day-to-
day management but with ensuring that the overall policies of the agency are consistent with 
its legal mandate. This includes, in particular, the investigation of proper conduct, efficacy, 
and effectiveness.”50 Hillebrand explains that the intelligence oversight process stands on 
the foundation of four main elements: “executive, legal, judicial, and public oversight.”51 
Additionally, Hillebrand identifies accountability as “being liable to be required to give an 
account or explanation of actions and where appropriate, to suffer the consequences, take the 
blame or undertake to put matters right if it should appear that errors have been made.”52 
Aldrich and Kasuku agree and emphasize the need for accountability of intelligence agencies 
in achieving and maintaining public confidence.53 
Ruben Arcos, Matei and Bruneau concur on the importance of maintaining a balance 
between the intelligence agencies’ effectiveness and a transparent intelligence culture that’s 
open to democratic values and requirements.54 Arcos, for one, uses the Spanish National 
Intelligence Center’s (CNI) initiative of signing an agreement with the public universities, 
designed to promote openness and an information-sharing culture, as a successful example 
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of bringing about effective intelligence culture.55 Arcos continues by emphasizing that this 
culture of openness and collaboration helped expand the analytical capabilities of the CNI 
officers while bridging the gap between the public and the Spanish intelligence agency.56 
Matei and Bruneau concur and suggest that successful intelligence services should maintain 
a delicate balance between state democratic control while keeping the national intelligence 
services’ effectiveness.57 Hamrah agrees and provides an even more detailed description of 
the processes required to ensure a thriving intelligence culture.58 Hamrah asserts that to 
achieve the ultimate objective of ensuring the safety and protection of national security, “it 
is essential for the Intelligence Community to adapt and evolve to address the increasingly 
complex threat environment. This requires a pragmatic need to a share-culture, an increase 
in timely access to information, as well as a decrease in turf wars and stove piping.”59 
Hamrah emphasizes the reality of today’s contemporary threats and insists on the centrality 
of including both behavioral and structural reforms. He also states a few recommendations 
designed to improve the organizational intelligence culture. Hamrah identifies the following 
recommendations to achieve intelligence reforms: cultural assessment, strategic vision, focus 
groups, cultural embedding mechanisms, leaders as cultural embedding mechanisms, 
management, change processes, training programs, security clearances, and performance 
benchmarking.60 Matei and Bruneau agree with Hamrah on the centrality and impact of the 
intelligence organization’s founders and leaders on its culture; they point out that 
understanding the intelligence community leaders’ culture would assist to better design and 
modify a reform process to ensure thriving intelligence culture.61  
Similarly, Chiru identifies the perceptions of society as a whole as an essential 
element needed to understand the required steps and processes for intelligence culture 
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reforms.62 More specifically, Chiru emphasizes the importance of each individual’s 
contributions to national security efforts. Chiru advances the notion of Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) and the crowdsourcing principles as part of her evaluation of the social 
responsibility theory and its applicability to national security intelligence.63 
Phythian, on the other hand, notes that the national intelligence is a unique state’s 
component, and cannot be understood without the thorough understanding and evaluation of 
a group of a complex set of factors.64 Pythian argues that to thoroughly analyze the national 
intelligence culture of any state, there should be a thorough understanding of the state’s 
national history, its geopolitical concerns, the state regime type, its organizational culture, 
and the intersection between the intelligence and political cultures in terms of the existing 
balance between secrecy and transparency. In sum, intelligence reforms are crucial to the 
state’s quest for a successful democratic transition. Successful intelligence reforms require a 
comprehensive understanding of what constitutes intelligence culture and what processes 
could lead to a successful intelligence culture. 
 POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESIS 
The preceding literature review indicates that consolidating democracies need to 
develop intelligence cultures that are supportive of their intelligence organizations, roles, and 
practices within the broader context of crafting democratic intelligence agencies that comply 
with international democratic values and norms, while successfully protecting the state and 
citizens’ security and safety, which is a prerequisite for a successful and sustained democratic 
consolidation.65 Toward this end, building on Chiru’s “multilevel model of analysis of 
intelligence culture,”66 I hypothesize that consolidating democracies could achieve this 
outcome through the following approaches and processes: maintaining a balance between 
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the intelligence services’ democratization and effectiveness67 via a collective institutional 
effort under the umbrella of a legislative body to update the existing “obsolete” legal 
frameworks to be in line with democratic intelligence functions, provide a clear security 
mandate, ensure parliamentary accountability and judicial oversight,68 ensure competent 
political guidance for the national intelligence strategies and doctrines, foster a culture of 
information sharing and timely access to information among the different intelligence 
agencies,69 and allocate enough funds and resources for the intelligence structure to deliver 
effective training and operational outcomes.70 This approach is aimed at satisfying the public 
and international demands of intelligence activities, transparency and accountability. These 
approaches are both inclusive of all components of society as well as all public institutions 
to actively participate in the security project. Their results include increased public trust in 
their intelligence services and increased intelligence service activity through the utility of 
using other public institutions in the total security project. 
 RESEARCH DESIGN 
To answer the question of this thesis, I conducted a comparative analysis of academic 
research results and three case studies. The existing academic and scholarly literature is rich 
with attempts to theoretically conceptualize and adequately define intelligence culture. The 
answer to the question requires analytical investigation of the competing theories governing 
the definition of intelligence culture in a comparative study aimed at identifying gaps, and 
concludes with a contemporary conception and definition of intelligence culture. 
Subsequently, the academic theoretical and analytical findings are applied to three 
cases of intelligence reforms as part of the democratization process: Spain, Romania, and 
Tunisia. The three selected countries underwent successful democratic transitions and 
intelligence reforms through different periods while at different democratic consolidation 
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stages. Moreover, the three selected countries had similar prior repressive intelligence 
services and similar public perceptions of their respective intelligence services. The 
similarities among the three selected case studies will aid in identifying the role of 
intelligence culture on the democratic consolidation process as well as the conceptual 
framework used by each case for its specific intelligence culture. 
This research relies mainly on scholarly books, international and Arabic journal 
articles, as well as think tank reports related to relevant theories and study cases. 
Additionally, this research utilizes current events and news updates retrieved from reputable 
international and regional news outlets when appropriate.  
 THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The thesis is comprised of five chapters. Chapter I introduces the major research 
question, explains the significance of this research, presents a literature review, and finally 
presents some explanations and hypotheses for answering the thesis question. Chapter II is a 
case study of Spain’s domestic and foreign intelligence agencies, examines its intelligence 
culture history, and explains its intelligence culture reform processes, its successes and 
challenges. Chapter III is a case study of Romania’s domestic and foreign intelligence 
agencies, examines its intelligence culture history and explains its intelligence culture reform 
processes, its successes and challenges. Chapter IV is a case study of Tunisia’s domestic and 
foreign intelligence agencies, examines its intelligence culture history and explains its 
intelligence culture reform processes, its successes, and challenges. Chapter V provides a 
comparative analysis between Spain, Romania, and Tunisia’s attempts to develop 
intelligence cultures and provides the findings of this research to test the research hypothesis 
against these findings. Finally, this chapter offers a conclusion and recommendations for the 
development of an intelligence culture reform framework that could be used by countries 




Spain was under the oppressive and authoritarian regime of General Franco 
between 1936 to 1975. General Franco’s regime utilized Spain’s military, security forces, 
and intelligence agencies as tools to preserve and protect the regime and ensure its 
survival.71 Since its transition to democracy in 1975, Spain has striven to democratize its 
intelligence agencies—i.e., develop effective institutions, while also under democratic 
control and oversight. With this background, Spain has also endeavored to bring about an 
intelligence culture within and outside its intelligence agencies. Today, Spain is one of the 
very few new democracies that enjoys a rich intelligence culture in terms of openness, 
transparency, and effectiveness.72 This chapter provides an overview of Spain’s efforts to 
develop this advanced intelligence culture. It starts with an overview on Spain’s existing 
intelligence services and intelligence control and oversight mechanisms, followed by a 
discussion of background and reforms and a conclusion.  
 SPAIN’S CURRENT INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES 
Currently, Spain has six main intelligence agencies: the National Intelligence 
Center (CNI), the General Commissariat for Intelligence (CGI), the Civil Guard 
Intelligence Service (SIGC), the Center of Intelligence of the Armed Forces (CIFAS), the 
Customs Surveillance Service (SVA), and the Financial Intelligence Unit (SEPBLAC). 
Figure 1 illustrates the structure of Spain’s intelligence apparatus and the different 
agencies’ mutual relationships.  
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Figure 1. Spain’s intelligence community73 
Figure 1 shows the six intelligence agencies under their respective ministries. The 
ministries provide a direct control function over their respective intelligence agencies.  
1. Ministry of Presidency 
In May 2002, Spain established the National Intelligence Center (CNI) as a 
replacement for the Superior Defense Information Center (CESID), established in 1977—
a scandal-plagued agency that failed to uphold to the intelligence democratic values and 
reforms.74 The CNI functions as a central intelligence body that is tasked with ensuring 
and maintaining Spain’s national security. The CNI is charged with the collection, analysis 
and dissemination of both domestic and foreign intelligence, Covert Action, and 
counterintelligence missions. Additionally, the same Act of 11/2002 established the 
Government Delegate Commission for Intelligence Affairs (CDGAI) as a responsible 
board to overlook and coordinate the all of the elements of CNI’s intelligence efforts.75 
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The center functions as a hub responsible for managing and integrating various national 
security and intelligence agencies—the National Police Corps’ information services, the 
State Security Forces, and other civil and military bodies of the administration (Act 11/
2002).76 Moreover, per the Act 11/2002, the CNI’s Director is also responsible for 
overseeing two more intelligence-related bodies: the National Cryptologic Center (CCN), 
which is tasked with securing the communications methods used to transmit and receive 
any classified information, and the National Security Office (ONS), which is responsible 
for ensuring the security of classified information, including NATO’s classified 
documents.77 The CNI structure includes the Directorship, the General Secretariat, Legal 
Affairs office, and three directorates: Operations, Analysis, and Resources.78  
The CNI falls under the Ministry of Presidency, and “its main purpose is to provide 
the Prime Minister and the Government of Spain with information, analysis, studies or 
proposals that enable the prevention and avoidance of any danger, threat or aggression 
against the independence or territorial integrity of Spain, its national interests and the 
stability of its institutions and the rule of law.”79 
The same article, 11/2002, considers all information related to CNI top-secret 
classified information, including operations, structure, resources, and organizations. The 
only exception for the CNI classification is matters regarding budget and personnel, which 
are kept available and accessible.80 Still, the CNI has a confidential fund which is assigned 
for intelligence-related confidential activities. 
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2. Intelligence Agencies Under the Ministry of Interior  
The Ministry of Interior oversees both the national police intelligence agencies and 
the Civil Guard Intelligence Agency.81 First, the Spanish national police intelligence 
agencies comprise the General Commissariat for Intelligence (CGI) and the three regional 
police intelligence units. Additionally, the Ministry of Interior houses the National Fusion 
Center Focused on Fighting Crime and Terrorism (CITCO), which is staffed collectively 
by intelligence officers from the National Police, Prison Authority, Customs Service, Civil 
Guard, and a unit from the CNI. Second, the Civil Guard Intelligence Service (SIGC), 
which is the intelligence arm of the Civil Guard. Notably, both the Civil Guard and SIGC 
operate mutually under both the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defense. Despite 
the fact that SIGC has similar tasks as the CGI, the Civil Guard is primarily tasked with 
conducting its operations in the rural and border areas.82 
3. Intelligence Agencies Under the Ministry of Defense  
The Ministry of Defense intelligence operations are conducted through the Center 
of Intelligence of the Armed Forces (CIFAS), which was established by Royal Decree No. 
1551 in June 2004.83 CIFAS functions as a coordination body of various military, tactical 
and operational intelligence missions conducted by the Army, Navy, and Air Force as part 
of Spain’s Intelligence System of the Armed Forces (SIFAS). CIFAS is responsible for the 
strategic intelligence planning for the General Defense Staff (EMAD) as well as for 
advising the policymakers of potential threats and crises to the nation.84 According to 
Arcos, “The mission of the CIFAS is complementary to that of the CNI, which oversees 
the joint military Intelligence Plan and provides directives for coordination and 
cooperation.”85 
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4. Intelligence Agencies Under the Ministry of Economy  
The Ministry of Economy has two intelligence agencies: the Customs Surveillance 
Service, which is focused on contraband, illegal drugs, and financial evasion and violation, 
among other areas, and the Financial Intelligence Unit, which coordinates all of the 
financial intelligence efforts aimed at preventing money laundering and terrorism 
financing.86 The CNI leads and coordinates the economic, commercial, and industrial 
intelligence efforts through the existing intelligence agencies, as well as the economic and 
commercial offices within the Spanish diplomatic missions abroad.87 
 CONTROL AND OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE IN SPAIN 
CNI law of 2002 provided the general framework for Spain’s existing control and 
oversight mechanics and methods.88 The law represents the Spanish government’s and 
political elites’ desire to institutionalize transparency and accountability of the intelligence 
sector in parallel with an intelligence culture that promotes understanding and trust in 
intelligence services and their roles.89 
The Government Delegate Committee for Intelligence Affairs (CDGAI), headed by 
the deputy prime minister, serves as an executive-control tool for Spain’s intelligence 
community in terms of providing direction and guidance as well as coordinating various 
agencies’ intelligence activities. Additionally, since 2005 the newly established National 
Defense Council (CDN) provides the prime minister with defense and intelligence updates 
and sets Spain’s national security strategic goals and priorities. Moreover, each of the 
Ministries that include one or more intelligence services plays a direct role in providing 
control over their respective agencies’ functions and activities.90  
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The Defense Committee of the Congress of Deputies provides the legislative 
oversight function over the CNI intelligence activities in terms of confidential funds 
management, CNI leadership hearings, and preparing an annual CNI activities report.91  
The Spanish Supreme Court provides the legal and judicial control mechanism over 
any CNI intrusive activities. The CNI law of 2002 dictates that the CNI director must obtain 
official and prior approval before the agency can conduct any intrusive intelligence 
function, which includes invasive measures against individuals or groups.92 The request 
should specify estimated time and geographical boundaries for the operation.93  
The Spanish media and civil society represent the unofficial oversight authority for 
intelligence activities and misconduct. According to Matei, Garcia, and Halladay, the 
Spanish media has proven elemental to intelligence oversight and intelligence reform 
efforts, because these external watchdogs exposed intelligence scandals of the 1990s, 
which resulted in intelligence community reforms (including the adoption of a more 
democratic intelligence structure based on legislative and judicial oversight and 
accountability).94 On the same note, Diaz identifies media investigative journalism as the 
medium through which both the public and politicians can see what lies behind the thick 
curtains of the intelligence apparatus.95 
 BACKGROUND ON INTELLIGENCE CULTURE  
Spain’s intelligence culture reform was gradual—a result of multiple endeavors, 
including political elite’s desire and knowledge, international and regional cooperation, 
and the threat environment. 
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1. Intelligence Reforms Without Instigating the Military (1975-1981) 
Since Spain’s transition to democracy on 19 November 1975, Spain’s political 
elites have tried to reform the state intelligence agencies to regain public trust through 
reintroducing a new intelligence apparatus and abolishing the stigma of Franco’s era of 
oppressive practices.96 The creation of the Superior Defense Information Center (CESID) 
in 1977 was an integral part of the political elites’ larger efforts to consolidate the 
democratic transition process.97 Yet, according to Matei, de Castro Garcia, and Halladay, 
the CESID could not provide a successful intelligence culture reform due to four main 
factors.98 First, there was the hefty legacy of the country’s authoritarian past. Second, 
CESID was infected with a large number of Franco-era intelligence officers who assumed 
senior positions within the newly established organization. Third, the armed forces 
dominated the CESID structure by excluding civilians from staff and leadership positions. 
As a result, Spain’s intelligence functions were mostly ineffective due to influence rivalries 
and lack of coordination between the CESID and the other domestic law enforcement 
intelligence agencies—the Civil Guard and National Police. Fourth (as the last but most 
important) is the political elites’ reluctance to enforce more pragmatic intelligence reforms 
for fear of instigating a hostile military reaction and the possible danger of their stalling 
the democratization process.99 Indeed, as Arcos also explains, the early intelligence 
reforms stalled due to a variety of reasons. Still, they are linked to Spain’s Franco-era 
legacy, or as he articulates his argument: “intelligence is inextricably linked with the 
political system it serves.”100  
The early years of Spain’s democratic transition were challenging to the political 
elites, as they had to navigate carefully through the democratic transition process without 
instigating the armed forces’ contempt, which would lead to their interference in the 
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political process and abort the democratic consolidation. The resulting intelligence reforms 
were marginal at best due to the aforementioned reasons. The intelligence culture was 
fundamentally absent from the intelligence reform agenda as the political elite lacked 
adequate knowledge and willingness to adopt a more open approach to make peace with 
the past and hold the intelligence agencies accountable for their past and present conduct. 
The political elites’ attitude toward the intelligence culture reform could be linked to their 
fear of instigating the military and intelligence hostilities and opposition to the democratic 
reform efforts.  
2. De-Militarizing the Intelligence Apparatus 
The failed coup of 23 February 1981 and its consequences represented a pivotal 
point for the relationship between the political elites, the military and the rules of the 
political game,101 and subsequently led to a breakthrough in the intelligence culture reform 
process.  
The failed coup of 1981 gave the political elite the will and authority to demand 
further and deeper intelligence reforms as they introduced a new legal framework to ensure 
that the feared Spanish military would not interfere in the political domain and would 
support the democratization effort. Thus, the CESID went through the first intelligence 
culture reform phase. Matei, Garcia, and Halladay argue that the appointment of General 
Alonso Manglano as director of CESID initiated a series of intelligence reforms and 
subsequently caused an improvement in intelligence culture.102 They also point out that 
the CESID adopted a more modern and professional approach to the intelligence process, 
and cleansed the intelligence agency from the remnants of the Franco era as well as the 
military’s influence over the agency’s procedures and practices.103 The CESID reforms 
resulted in the intelligence community’s first attempt to adopt an intelligence culture based 
on more professional intelligence practices and better interagency coordination and 
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cooperation aimed at increasing the intelligence apparatus’s ability to fight the increasing 
terrorist threats. For example, the president created an interagency coordination center at 
the prime minister’s office to facilitate the process and avoid misunderstandings.104  
These first attempts to reform the intelligence culture were necessary but fell short 
of what would have been considered a comprehensive reform. Matei, Garcia, and Halladay 
note two significant causes for the inadequate intelligence culture reforms.105 First, the 
CESID leadership was infected with several corrupted ex-military intelligence officers, 
which caused them to maintain power and bad influence within the agency. Second, the 
political elites did not follow through on the reform process to ensure civilian control over 
the CESID and civilian oversight over the intelligence practices and operations. The 
political elites lacked the knowledge, expertise, and will to step in until they were forced 
to do so by the subsequent scandals that rocked the Spanish intelligence community in the 
1990s. For example, even after the 1995 wave of intelligence reforms, the whole Council 
of Ministers refrained from signing a document that represented the CESID objectives, 
which was prepared by the CESID leadership in an attempt to align the agency with the 
best democratic intelligence practices and norms.106  
In the absence of effective official oversight of the intelligence agencies, the media 
stepped in to provide an unofficial oversight platform, which helped uncover multiple 
financial and political corruption cases all linked to the CESID. Diaz argues that the press 
had to step up as a supervision platform over the state administration and the intelligence 
agencies, due to the chronic lack of intelligence mechanisms.107 According to Matei, 
Garcia, and Halladay, the negative intelligence culture was the root cause behind the lack 
of efficient democratic civilian control and oversight.108 They explain that the official 
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oversight body in the Spanish example represented by the legislative committee lacked the 
authority, knowledge, and expertise to perform the oversight process effectively.109 In 
addition, they note the politicization of the political sphere within the legislative committee 
as an additional cause for the regress of proper oversight of the intelligence agencies.110 
The political elites preferred to pursue matters of interest to their respective parties over 
intelligence matters. Furthermore, the legislative committee had limited access to 
intelligence-related information due to the legal restrictions to declassify intelligence 
documents. The intelligence community used “the Law of Official Secrets 9/1969, as 
modified by Law 48/1978,”111 to justify its culture of secrecy and its disdain of the 
legislative oversight process.  
The lack of effective judicial control over the CESID and the rest of the intelligence 
agencies contributed to and adverse intelligence culture. For example, in the 1990s, the 
CESID exceeded its jurisdiction and conducted unauthorized invasive surveillance even 
though the existing legal framework back then required judicial approval before conducting 
any invasive surveillance operations.112 The prevailing intelligence culture at that time 
resulted in the intelligence agencies choosing a path of secrecy and mistrust of the civilian 
side of the government. 
3. Intelligence Culture Reforms Post September 11, 2001  
The political elites grew more aware of the increased and complex security threats 
following the September 11 terrorist attack in New York and Washington, D.C. 
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Additionally, the political elites recognized the need to replace the “scandal infected” 
CESID with the newly created CNI.113 
Arcos identifies the lack of supportive intelligence culture as the leading cause of 
the absence of intelligence from university curricula. Matei, Garcia, and Halladay, also 
note the scarcity of scholarly intelligence research and publications. They identify the lack 
of a supportive intelligence as a root cause for this literature scarcity. On one side the 
intelligence agencies had a culture of secrecy and mistrust toward academia and the civilian 
institutions; on the other, the stigma of non-democratic and intrusive practices that 
associated the intelligence agencies with the Franco era of political policing culture 
discouraged academia from taking part in any intelligence-related academic efforts.114 
Arcos and Chiru add that the presence of intelligence in university courses before the mid-
2000s was almost nonexistent.115  
4. 11 March 2004 (3/11), Madrid Terrorist Attack 
The magnitude and size of the 3/11 terrorist attack—a coordinated attack on four 
different locations, “killing 193 people, and wounding 1858 others”116—resonated loudly 
within the public and the political elites’ spheres, and resulted in demands to identify and 
fix the intelligence failures leading to the 3/11 strategic surprise. Since the 3/11 terrorist 
attacks, Spain has undergone a series of continuous efforts to reform the intelligence 
process and advance its intelligence culture. The main driver behind the reform inertia was 
the growing desire and appetite of the political elites in both “boosting the agencies’ 
effectiveness in fighting terrorism, while also strengthening oversight and advancing the 
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intelligence culture.”117 Similarly, Arcos notes a shift in the Spanish authorities’ stance 
from the existing adverse intelligence culture post 3/11; he believes that the CNI’s 
intelligence culture initiative has activated a new policy of openness and cooperation in an 
attempt to promote an intelligence culture of trust that will boost the intelligence agencies’ 
effectiveness.118 Nonetheless, two main challenges tested the political elites in their quest 
to reform the intelligence services and advance the intelligence culture.  
5. Challenges to Reform Spain’s Intelligence Culture  
The first challenge was to eradicate the culture of mistrust and skepticism that 
existed between the intelligence apparatus and the democratic civilian institutions. Both 
the CNI leadership and the political elites recognized the challenge of both intelligence 
effectiveness and the process of intelligence democratization. The political authorities took 
on these challenges by first engaging the universities and academia in building a 
partnership initiative to introduce the intelligence topics in the universities’ learning and 
research domains, creating academic research teams, and pursuing the expertise of 
academic scholars to advance intelligence analysis and research capacity.119 Additionally, 
they adopted a culture of transparency and trust by leaving behind the existing culture of 
secrecy; for example, Chiru argues that, by fully embracing the values of the “law to 
transparency, access to public information, and good governance”120 introduced in 2013, 
the intelligence agencies would gain both public trust through adopting an image of a 
socially sensible actor, and enhance the outcome of security and intelligence research and 
studies at the same time.121 
The second challenge was to overcome an intelligence culture that was based on 
division and antagonism. The intelligence culture of that time was characterized by turf 
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wars and a lack of trust and coordination among the different agencies within Spain’s 
intelligence apparatus. Arcos argues that the aftermath of the 3/11 terrorist attack caused 
political elites to look closely into intelligence flaws and deficiencies in their attempt to 
identify the reasons behind the 3/11 intelligence failures.122 He explains that the creation 
of various Coordination centers—like the CNI, the Executive committee for the Unified 
Command of State Security Forces and Corps (CEMU), the Executive Commission for 
Coordination of the State Secretary for Security, the External Information Central Unit 
(UCIE), the National Counterterrorism Coordination Center (CNCA), the Center of 
Intelligence Against Organized Crime (CICO), the National Center for Crisis Management 
(CNCSC)—was mainly aimed to create a culture of information sharing and coordination 
among all of the intelligence stakeholders and professionals.123 Matei, Garcia, and 
Halladay agree with Arcos and note that the policymakers’ efforts to bring the different 
intelligence actors to work together was increasingly successful. They add that Spain’s 
ability to advance its intelligence culture not only instituted a path for effective IC capable 
of defending national safety and security, but also created a healthy environment for a 
culture of sharing and cooperation with partner and allied nations.124 
 CONCLUSION 
Overall, while Spain’s intelligence reforms are still a work in progress, there is 
consensus among intelligence scholars in advocating for Spain’s intelligence culture 
reform as an example of a successful endeavor and good practice.125 In the area of 
legislative oversight, there has been a shift from the chronic culture of secrecy which 
plagued the intelligence scene for decades; a good example is the National High Court 
decision to declassify all of the CNI documents that relate to the CIA activities during the 
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World War on Terror using Spain’s territories.126 The area of intelligence effectiveness 
has improved as a result of the latest intelligence culture reforms as well. The culture of 
openness between the civilian and military intelligence partners, as well as the culture of 
cooperation and coordination in sharing intelligence within different domestic and 
international intelligence partners and allies, has proven critical in averting multiple 
terrorist and organized crime attacks.127 
On the downside of the culture reform process, Matei, Garcia, and Halladay identify 
an ethical gap as a significant area of concern which, if not appropriately addressed, might 
adversely impact Spain’s intelligence reforms and effectiveness.128 They point out the lack 
of efficient, ethical rules and regulations as the potential danger which might lead to new 
or worsening stigma, which could lead subsequently to loss of public and political trust and 
support.129 Although intelligence effectiveness relies on multiple factors, political 
authority support is elemental for intelligence success. Such political support translates to 
needed financial funds for the different intelligence functions that ensure effective and 
efficient operations.  
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III. ROMANIA 
Between 1947 and 1989, Romania was an extremely oppressive communist 
dictatorship, first under Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, and then under Nicolae Ceausescu. It 
transitioned to democracy violently in 1989.130 Since then, Romania’s efforts to reform its 
intelligence services and advance democratic intelligence culture have been rather 
successful, considering the relatively short transition period since the country’s transition 
to democracy and also the highly abusive intelligence agency—the Securitate—during the 
non-democratic regime, which people feared and mistrusted. Romania today stands equal 
to the leading democratic nations who had a substantial democratic history and experience 
in terms of achieving the right balance between civilian control over intelligence agencies 
while maintaining effective intelligence capabilities. Additionally, Romania’s intelligence 
culture has evolved as a result of multiple factors that vary from the political elite’s desire 
to reform to the international community’s support of good democratic intelligence 
culture.131 This chapter provides an overview of Romania’s effort to develop this advanced 
intelligence culture. It starts with an overview of Romania’s existing intelligence 
atmosphere in terms of its structure, stakeholders, and the control and oversight 
mechanisms, followed by a discussion of Romania’s intelligence culture’s background and 
reforms and a conclusion. 
 ROMANIA’S INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES 
Currently, Romania has an intelligence structure which is composed of six different 
intelligence agencies: the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), the Foreign Intelligence 
Service (SIE), the Guard and Protection Service (SPP), the Special Telecommunication 
Service (STS), the Directorate for Intelligence and Internal Protection (DIPI), and the 
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Directorate for General Information of the Armed Forces (DGIA).132 The existing six 
intelligence agencies have different but sometimes overlapping mandates and tasks. Four 
out of the six intelligence agencies– SRI, SIE, SPP, STS–are independent agencies, and 
the other two–DIPI and DGIA–fall under the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of 
Interior’s direct control.133  
1. Independent Agencies 
• The Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI): established on 26 March 1990, 
the SRI is mainly tasked with domestic intelligence collection and analysis 
functions needed to ensure Romania’s national security. The SRI does not 
have any power to arrest or detain suspects.134 
• The Foreign Intelligence Service (SIE): established in February 1990,135 
the SIE is mainly responsible for conducting intelligence operations 
abroad as required to maintain Romania’s national interests.136  
• The Guard and Protection Service (SPP): established in May 1990 and 
tasked mainly with protecting Romanian and foreign dignitaries and 
conducting its protection functions, the service was authorized to perform 
a variety of clandestine intelligence operations.137 
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• Special Telecommunication Service (STS): established in 1996, it was 
tasked with coordinating Romania’s telecommunication services, as well 
as conducting national Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) operations.138 
2. The Ministry of Defense Intelligence Agency 
The Ministry of Defense’s Directorate for General Information of the Armed Forces 
(DGIA), which was established in January 2001, is mainly tasked with conducting 
domestic and foreign intelligence collection and analysis regarding any threats to 
Romania’s national security. Additionally, the DGIA is tasked with “the protection of 
security information and cryptographic activities as well as the geographical intelligence 
needed by the military.”139 Moreover, the DGIA oversees both the Directorate of 
Intelligence and Military Representation (DIRM), which oversees military operations 
abroad, and the Directorate of Military Security (DSM), which is tasked mainly with 
counter-espionage activities.140 
3. The Ministry of Interior Intelligence Service 
The General Directorate for Intelligence and Internal Protection (DIPI)141 was 
created in 1999 with the main task of fighting organized crime and terrorism through the 
collection and analysis of relevant intelligence.142 
 CONTROL AND OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE IN ROMANIA 
The intelligence apparatus is mainly controlled through the National Defense 
Supreme Council (CSAT), which was established in December 1990 as an executive 
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branch body to control Romania’s different intelligence agencies.143 The CSAT serves as 
a coordination and control body responsible for intelligence-related tasks and resource 
allocation.144 The Romanian president chairs the CSAT; other members are the prime 
minister (vice-chair), the Ministers of Defense, Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Industry, as 
well as the SRI and SIE directors, chief of the general staff, and the president’s national 
security advisor.145 Figure 2 describes Romania’s intelligence structure as well as its 
control and oversight institutions. Additionally, Figure 2 highlights Romania’s semi-
presidential political system where the president is the head of the Supreme Council of 
National Defense (SCND), which grants him a central role in commanding and controlling 
national security.146  
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Figure 2. The system of national security in Romania147 
1. Legislative Oversight 
Romania’s legislative oversight and control over intelligence are conducted 
through both of the two Permanent Committees (one committee for each chamber) for 
Defense, Public Order, and National Security, as well as the Joint Special Committee 
(members from both chambers) of SRI oversight, and the Joint Special Committee (both 
chambers) of SIE oversight.148 The Permanent Committees are responsible for overseeing 
all of the independent intelligence agencies’ activities, as well as initiating and amending 
security laws, approving and monitoring funds, requesting intelligence reports and 
legislative hearings, and conducting investigations.149 Comparatively, the joint Special 
Committees oversee their respective agencies concerning their compliance with their legal 
and constitutional frameworks, investigate illegal intelligence conduct, hold hearings for 
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the director nominees, assess the director’s annual reports, and request further data and 
information from their respective agencies.150  
Fiscal oversight is one of the most effective tools of the civilian authorities to 
exercise their democratic control over the intelligence agencies.151 The Romanian example 
ensures control over the budgetary allocations through the use of four different methods; 
first, the two permanent Parliament’s Committees through their legal authority to approve 
and monitor funds;152 second, the Parliament’s two joint Special Committees, which “have 
the right to assess the draft budgetary allocations for the intelligence agencies and submit 
their reviews to the Parliament;”153 third, the annual government report of its activities to 
the Parliament;154 fourth, the Court of Audit, which supports the Parliament through its 
control powers over the intelligence agencies, among other state and public sector 
institutions.155 Parliamentary investigations, interpellation, and questions are additional 
essential and practical tools of oversight at the disposal of the legislative branch.156 Matei 
argues that the Romanian Legislature holds great powers over the different intelligence 
agencies, and this legislative power, if used correctly, could ensure an effective checks and 
balances system.157 
2. Judicial Oversight 
The Romanian judicial oversight of the intelligence agencies’ activities is ensured 
through the judiciary’s right to monitor and authorize the intelligence use of their powers, 
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as stated in the National Security Law of 1991.158 The judiciary is responsible for 
maintaining the balance between the intelligence agencies’ need to collect intelligence 
using covert or intrusive means with the protection of citizens’ human rights and 
privacy.159  
3. Informal Intelligence Oversight 
Civil society and the media played a significant role in providing oversight over 
intelligence at different levels throughout the Romanian intelligence reform experience.160 
According to Matei, the Romanian civil society has rushed from regarding their 
intelligence agencies as tools of oppression in the hands of the past rulers to a civil society 
that trusts and supports an effective and transparent intelligence culture.161 She continues 
to note that the post-1989 legal framework has ensured an active civil society engagement 
in partnership and monitoring roles. Civil society grows from a victim to a partner with the 
intelligence community’s effort to achieve a balance between intelligence effectiveness 
and transparency.162 Similarly, the Romanian media was critical for the success of the 
Romanian democratization process. Matei argues that the media has played the role of 
unofficial oversight authority over the intelligence reforms and functions.163 She adds that 
the media—through exposing all the intelligence wrongdoings and shortcomings—was 
critical to persuade the political elites and the intelligence officials to continue the reform 
process.164  
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 BACKGROUND ON INTELLIGENCE CULTURE  
Securitate—a colloquial name for the Communist Romanian Department for State 
Security of the Ministry of Internal Affairs—was the predecessor of the present-day 
intelligence apparatus. Securitate was an oppressive intelligence and security structure; its 
main mission was preserving and protecting Ceausescu’s totalitarian regime.165 The 
Securitate intelligence culture was one that had a fragile foundation, an intelligence culture 
that was based mainly on the absence of credible and accurate information, and instead 
relied on the impressions and myths of an oppressive, omniscient, and omnipresent 
intelligence apparatus.166 Matei identifies two main phases for the intelligence reform, a 
pre and post-NATO/EU integration, as part of her argument of the centrality to Romania’s 
political elites’ desire to satisfy the NATO and EU pre-conditions for membership as a 
driver for the intelligence reform effort.167 In this context, Chiru argues that Romania’s 
intelligence culture emerged in the early 2000s as a joint effort between the intelligence 
professionals and civil society in general and academia in particular.168 Chiru also notes 
that the Romanian case represents a needed culture to both achieve a balance between 
secrecy and transparency and root itself in Romanian society. Intelligence agencies need 
to address the “trauma of the communist past and [learn] how to implement a process of 
de-communization of perceptions.”169  
1. The Post Revolution Phase (1989-2000) 
Immediately after the demise of the Ceausescu dictatorship and the execution of 
Ceausescu, the Romanian political authorities were eager to distance themselves from the 
practices of the past and establish democratic institutions as soon as possible. According 
to Matei, the first two years following the end of the regime in 1989 were characterized by 
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unreasonable and often careless reforms to the new state institutions, including the 
intelligence services.170 For example, the political authorities decided to immediately 
dismantle the Securitate and establish multiple intelligence agencies—the creation of the 
SIE, SRI, SPP, and an Intelligence Agency of the Ministry of Interior—before establishing 
a proper legal framework or knowing how to vet the previous Securitate intelligence 
officers before assigning them for the newly established intelligence agencies.171 
In the years following the Revolution up until the early 2000s, the Romanian 
political leadership continued their efforts to establish a democratic civilian control and 
oversight of the intelligence agencies as well as to introduce and approve the needed legal 
framework for a democratic intelligence’s conduct and operations, and to professionalize 
the intelligence agencies.172 Excellent examples of such effort are the establishment of the 
National Defense Supreme Council (CSAT) in 1991, the National Security Law 1991, and 
the National Defense College (NDC) in 1992.173  
The Romanian society’s severe trauma from its communist past, as well as the 
secretive nature of the Securitate intelligence culture, were the root causes of civil society’s 
delayed acceptance of the new intelligence institutions and culture.174 For example, the 
negative social perception of the term “security” as it translates to Securitate in the 
Romanian language, which resonates with the old Communist-era oppressive security 
apparatus. Additionally, as the Securitate culture, which had a fragile foundation because 
of the public vacuum of knowledge about intelligence institutions and operations, was 
substituted by a culture of myths, speculation, and uncertainties.175 Furthermore, the civil 
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society perceptions of their intelligence agencies were highly mythologized due to the lack 
of actual academic and media products.176 Dumitru identifies two main challenges for 
developing the Romanian intelligence culture: first, the secretive nature of the Romanian 
intelligence apparatus, which subsequently presents a challenge for academia and civil 
society to understand and analyze the actual Romanian intelligence’s structure and 
operations; second, the mythologized nature of the public understanding of the Romanian 
intelligence structures and capabilities.177 The two previous challenges are deeply rooted 
in the Communist-era’s secrecy legacy. The lack of knowledge, information, and literature 
about the Securitate and the intelligence functions, in addition to an extremely oppressive 
totalitarian regime, caused the Romanian public to revert to imagination and myths to 
understand what the intelligence agencies were, and what was considered to be a realistic 
expectations of intelligence agency performance. According to Dumitru, the needed 
approach to overcome the previously mentioned challenges would require engaging civil 
society in the process of creating a thriving intelligence culture through education and 
opening up about the past.178 She reiterates this point to show the importance of 
understanding the effects of the past communist atrocities and myths on the collective 
consciousness and perceptions as a prerequisite for developing a different kind of 
intelligence culture.179 
2. External Incentives for Intelligence Culture Reform 
Chiru and Matei argue that the intelligence reform journey in post-Communist 
Romania was influenced by factors from both within and outside of the Romanian political 
scene.180 Financial and political support gained by joining strong and influential regional 
and international organizations—like the NATO and EU—is a good example of external 
factors that influenced intelligence culture reforms. In this connection, the 1999 NATO 
                                                 
176 Chiru, “National Intelligence Cultures,” 221. 
177 Dumitru, “Building an Intelligence Culture From Within,” 581. 
178 Dumitru, 581. 
179 Dumitru, 581; Chiru, “National Intelligence Cultures.” 
180 Matei, “Balancing Democratic Civilian Control with Effectiveness of Intelligence in Romania,” 
624; Chiru, “National Intelligence Cultures,” 221. 
39 
Membership Action Plan (MAP) was an essential stimulus for the Romanian political elites 
to push further intelligence reforms in their pursuit of international integration. Similarly, 
the phenomenon of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on Washington, D.C., and New York 
represented a pivotal point for the intelligence reform in general and the advent of the 
intelligence culture in particular. As such, the fallouts of the 9/11 terrorist attacks have led 
the Romanian public and political elites, as well as the international community, to 
recognize and emphasize reliable and effective Romanian intelligence institutions.181  
The two primary intelligence culture reform challenges during this period were civil 
society grievances of the past and the political elites’ prioritization of the NATO and EU 
membership requirements over building a robust intelligence culture needed to transform 
the Romanian intelligence services. On the same note, the Romanian authorities’ decision 
to maintain the employment of former Securitate employees, including the corrupted ones, 
was primarily aimed at maintaining a capable intelligence apparatus.182 Likewise, the 
Romanian authorities’ decision to prioritize effectiveness over building a positive 
intelligence culture has added to the public mistrust and grievances of the past. At the same 
time, the prospect of NATO and EU membership, in particular these organizations’ 
requirements for the democratization of the state and the security sector, has boosted 
intelligence culture reform in Romania.183 Romania successfully joined NATO in 2004 
and the EU in 2007 in a clear indication of the commitment of the Romanian authorities to 
fulfill the required reforms of both organizations.184  
All of the Romanian authorities’ initiatives to reform the intelligence agencies—in 
terms of the legal framework, parliamentary and civilian oversight and openness—as 
required to access NATO/EU membership had been in line with the more critical society 
democratization process. An essential part of the authorities’ initiatives to reform and 
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advance proper intelligence culture was to spread an atmosphere of openness and 
transparency with Romanian civil society. The Romanian intelligence agencies grew more 
aware of the role and centrality of an educated and informed larger civil society for the 
success of the intelligence culture reform process.185 The intelligence agencies understood 
that without a culture of openness and transparency, the whole future intelligence culture 
would be challenged by public perceptions of the intelligence agencies, which would be 
based on the myths and grievances of the past.186 
3. Intelligence Culture of Openness and Transparency 
The intelligence community effort to address the issue of openness and 
transparency took the form of three different but collective approaches.187 First, there was 
the use of publicly accessible platforms as a virtual link between the intelligence agencies 
and civil society. For example, Dumitru argues that the intelligence initiative of using 
cyberspace to connect with civil society was a significant step forward for an intelligence 
culture of openness and transparency.188 Second, it was necessary to acknowledge and 
reconcile with the past of the Securitate through opening and declassifying its archives.189 
On 19 December 2005, the SRI handed over the Securitate library to the National Council 
for the Study of the Archives of the Securitate (CNSAS),190 even though access to personal 
records was granted since December 1999.191 Matei argues that this move of openness and 
transparency was partially credited to EU pressure toward openness and transparency in 
the years leading to Romania’s accession into EU in 2007.192 Third, there was a 
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partnership with academia—a vital transparency approach–that served as a tool to increase 
intelligence efficiency, as well as to maintain a culture of openness.193 The intelligence 
community was the driving force behind the surge of initiatives toward a better intelligence 
culture in general, and toward engaging academia in educational projects in particular.194 
The academic environment advanced new values for intelligence functions and culture. 
The intelligence culture of secrecy was no longer the only valued quality to measure a 
competent intelligence agency. Chiru and Matei note that academia, as a partner in the 
education project, was capable of both providing needed expertise in the field of 
intelligence studies and advocating for a professional and trustworthy intelligence culture 
at the same time.195 For example, the creation of the Romanian Intelligence Academy 
(ANI) in 1992 was mainly aimed at shaping the intelligence functions as a profession.196 
Dumitru adds that ANI is a unique institution with great value for advancing positive 
intelligence culture.197 Dumitru explains that the ANI provided a platform and framework 
for intelligence practitioners, academia, and civil society to debate, exchange information, 
and discuss best practices in the intelligence field. Additionally, the ANI facilitated the 
identification of a multidisciplinary community of experts in the fields of intelligence and 
other related academic fields—International Relations, Psychology, and Intercultural 
Studies—which could be used to widen the intelligence apparatus pool of resources needed 
to face future challenges.198 In this context, the Higher National Security College (HNSC) 
has been a critical element in advancing the intelligence culture in Romania.199 The HNSC, 
similar to ANI, is open to both civil society and intelligence practitioners, but more 
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importantly, it serves a unique role in educating public authorities and Parliament about 
intelligence and security functions and studies.200 Evidently, providing intelligence 
education and developing the civilian authorities and parliamentarians’ expertise is a 
critical step in advancing the intelligence culture in any consolidating democracy. The 
HNSC initiative of educating the politicians who control and oversee the intelligence 
agencies—about intelligence studies and best practices—will both increase the 
effectiveness of the oversight mechanism and create a positive atmosphere of trust and 
efficiency. 
The creation of the National Intelligence Community (CNI)—as an analytical 
fusion center—in November 2005 was an important step by the Romanian authorities in 
promoting an intelligence culture of effectiveness and professionalism.201 Matei argues 
that the CNI as an institution has served an essential purpose in preserving the intelligence 
agencies’ efforts and reduced the time and effort wasted by parallelism and lack of 
coordination among different intelligence players.202 Obviously, the positive CNI impact 
on the Romanian intelligence culture should not be considered in isolation of the broader 
reform efforts, such as the rich legal framework, the intelligence rules and regulations, and 
the rest of the civilian-led institutions.  
4. Challenges to Romanian Intelligence Culture Reform 
The Romanian intelligence community has achieved a considerable amount of 
reforms and transformed its intelligence culture into a more positive and democratic one in 
a remarkably short period. Nevertheless, the Romanian intelligence reforms still face 
considerable challenges that require the political elites and intelligence leadership’s full 
attention and consideration. The first challenge is the stagnation of the intelligence reforms 
following Romania’s full accession to both NATO and EU. Matei, Zulean and Sercan argue 
that the Romanian political elites lost interest in pursuing further democratic control and 
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oversight over the intelligence agencies after they successfully gained full accession into 
NATO and the EU.203 The intelligence reform process faced the challenge of losing the 
considerable value of NATO and EU membership incentive and accountability motives to 
the political elites, or as Matei put it, “the disappearance of EU/NATO ‘carrots’ and to a 
certain extent ‘sticks.’”204 The most significant impact of this challenge is the lack of 
effective monitoring and oversight by the parliament and Judiciary over the intelligence 
apparatus. Zulean and Sercan explain that the formal rules all have been established 
successfully in the years leading to Romania’s accession. Still, there is a gap when it comes 
to the effective implementation of the rules and regulations.205 Matei emphasizes the role 
of the media as a watchdog and informal oversight mechanism, which could provide an 
additional means to achieve the required balance between secrecy and transparency.206 
The second challenge is the politicization of the intelligence education system. The 
purpose behind creating the intelligence education system was to augment the knowledge 
and expertise of the politicians and others who will be responsible for performing the 
oversight and control functions within the Romanian government. Zulean and Sercan argue 
that the military and security education institutions have become tools to provide a 
convenient path for the elites to secure necessary political and government 
appointments.207 Additionally, there is the risk of providing intelligence agencies with an 
unsupervised monopoly over developing Romania’s intelligence culture. Zulean and 
Sercan note that intelligence agencies are using the notion of advancing the intelligence 
culture to justify what they described as the buildup of a “deep state.”208 Zulean and Sercan 
further explain that the intelligence education system allows the intelligence elites to 
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control the selection of future democratic elitespolitical, media, and judicialas a tool 
to control and resist complete democratic control over the intelligence agencies.209 
Although education is an integral part of developing intelligence culture, the intended 
intelligence culture has to be conceptually in line with the international literature’s 
definition of intelligence culture. Additionally, advancing intelligence culture through 
education has to be a balanced project, which falls under civilian control and oversight 
mechanisms, and not planned and controlled solely by the intelligence apparatus. 
 CONCLUSION 
Romanian intelligence reform and intelligence culture reform represent a 
contemporary case of a typical Eastern European country that resided under an oppressive 
totalitarian regime for a prolonged period. Romanian intelligence reforms were strongly 
influenced by both the public and political elites’ desire to move back into the liberal west, 
both for identity and financial purposes.210 Additionally, both NATO and EU, during and 
after the Romanian 1989 Revolution, had incentives to influence the Romanian intelligence 
reform and intelligence culture reform process.211 Nonetheless, after Romania’s successful 
accession into NATO and EU, the significant incentives and consequences offered by the 
NATO and EU institutions were not essential factors and incentives for the political elites 
anymore. Still, Romanian intelligence culture reforms have been successful in general in 
some areas and need more attention in others.212 In the area of democratic control, the 
Romanian authorities have been successful in establishing strict formal rules to govern the 
civilian control mechanisms over the intelligence agencies’ functions and activities.213 
Nonetheless, this oversight, both legislative and judicial, has suffered extensively after the 
NATO and EU accession, and gaps in the mechanisms of oversight have become 
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evident.214 According to Matei, the judiciary oversight has been infected with “corruption 
and limited understanding and knowledge of intelligence and security issues,” as well as a 
faulty legal framework.215 Moreover, Zulean and Sercan argue that the politicization of 
legislative oversight has crippled the democratic control mechanism, and caused legislators 
to stall and stagnate new attempts to modify the legal framework to enhance the democratic 
control of intelligence.216 
Conversely, the area of intelligence effectiveness has improved steadily throughout 
the intelligence reform process. NATO and EU assisting and providing the Romanian 
intelligence agencies access to their resources have proven elemental for advancing 
intelligence culture and building more effective institutions like the CNI.217 The new 
Romanian intelligence culture of openness and sharing with civil society through the 
education and training initiative has been central in increasing the effectiveness, mutual 
trust, and public support for the intelligence institutions in Romania. 
Finally, the Romanian intelligence culture, while on a positive trend, is still a work 
in progress, which requires more institutionalized and rigorous official and unofficial 
oversight to ensure a successful intelligence culture consolidation.  
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IV. TUNISIA 
Tunisia’s transition to democracy is relatively new compared to the other two cases 
of Spain and Romania. The Tunisian revolution took place following an unexpected popular 
uprising in December 2010, which successfully ended the 23-year autocratic rule of Zayn al-
’Abidin Bin ‘Ali (Bin Ali).218  
Tunisia’s democratic transition coincided with the rise of a terrorism-induced 
security threats in the MENA region. These terrorist groups presented an imminent and 
existential threat to Tunisia’s democracy project, especially with the return of thousands of 
Tunisian fighters from Iraq, Syria, and Libya.219 These security challenges have influenced 
the intelligence democratization in that it triggered a reform process that was focused on 
filling the existing security vacuum and maintaining Tunisia’s safety and security as soon as 
possible. As a result, Tunisia has managed to gradually improve its security and intelligence 
effectiveness in the fight against terrorism. Still, Tunisia’s efforts to advance a democratic 
and effective intelligence culture has been challenged by several factors, including the legacy 
of the Bin Ali’s intelligence and security apparatus and the existing security threat 
environment.  
This chapter provides an overview of Tunisia’s effort to develop its intelligence 
culture. The chapter starts with an overview of Tunisia’s existing intelligence atmosphere in 
terms of its structure, stakeholders and the control and oversight mechanisms, followed by a 
discussion of Tunisia’s intelligence culture’s background and reforms and a conclusion. 
 TUNISIA’S INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES 
The current Tunisian intelligence structure is comprised of four different agencies. 
Two of them are within the Ministry of Interior (MOI): the General Directorate of National 
                                                 
218 Noureddine Jebnoun. 2017. Tunisia’ s National Intelligence Why ‘Rogue Elephants’ Fail to 
Reform, 1. Washington, DC: New Academia Publishing. The Tunisian revolution influenced a series of 
similar uprisings in the neighboring Arab countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region in 
what was called the “Arab spring.” 
219 Anthony Dworkin and Fatim-Zohra El Malki, “The Southern Front Line: EU Counter-Terrorism 
Cooperation with Tunisia and Morocco,” (2018), 4. 
48 
Security (GDNS) and the General Directorate of National Guard (GDNG); one intelligence 
agency that falls under the Ministry of Defense (MOD), known as the Defense Intelligence 
and Security Agency (DISA); and one agency that falls within the presidential office, known 
as the General Directorate of Presidential Security and Protection of Prominent Officials 
(GDPSPPO).220 Matei and Kawar note the scarcity of reliable information regarding both 
the current roles of the GDNS and GDNG after the democratic transition in Tunisia.221 As 
a result, the roles and missions discussed in this chapter will be based mainly on the roles 
and missions as stipulated in the presidential decrees creating each of the two agencies.  
The General Directorate of National Security (GDNS) was created in 1967 by 
combining the police and National Guard (NG) into one organization.222 President 
Bourguiba created the GDNS as a response to the popular dissent toward his socio-economic 
failures, as well as his authoritarian role over the country.223 In 1984 Bin Ali –the director 
of GDNS back then— separated the GDNS and the GDNG into two different agencies to 
reorganize the MOI security services.224 According to Jebnoun, “the GNDS has three 
primary missions: maintain [ing] public order, monitoring borders, and foreigners, and 
investigating all aspects of political, economic, social, and cultural fields and reporting on 
them.”225 
The General Directorate of the National Guard (GDNG) was established in 1984 as 
a result of the MOI reorganization process, after splitting away from the GNDS. Jebnoun 
notes that the GDNG has six main missions: “Maintaining public order, protecting land and 
maritime borders, intervening throughout the country as a force of 2nd category, gathering 
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intelligence in the field of politics, investigating the social and economic fields, and 
providing civil protection.”226  
The Defense Intelligence and Security Agency (DISA) was established in 2014 as a 
replacement for the previous regime’s military intelligence services. According to Jebnoun, 
DISA has four major directorates: The General Directorate of External and Internal Security 
(GDIIS), The General Directorate of External Relations (GDER), The General Directorate 
of Specialized Services (GDSS), and The General Directorate for Securing Communications 
(GDSC). Additionally, DISA has its own training facilities: The Defense Language School 
and Training Center (DLSTC), and The School of Intelligence and Military Security 
(SIMS).227 DISA’s primary mission is the protection of “personnel, equipment, installations, 
and secrecy of the Ministry of National Defense.”228 
The General Directorate of Presidential Security and Protection of Prominent 
Officials (GDPSPPO) was established in 1984 as part of the GDNS but was subsequently 
placed under the president’s direct command following Bin Ali’s coup in 1987.229 Jebnoun 
notes that the GDPSPPO—among the other intelligence agencies—enjoyed extensive 
resources to enable the agency to accomplish its essential mission of protecting the regime. 
The GDPSPPO has its own intelligence service, which is called the Presidential Security 
Sub-Directorate of Intelligence (PSSDI), as well as a highly equipped and organized armed 
force of 3,000 people.230 Figure 3 exemplifies a diagram of Tunisia’s post-revolution 
intelligence structure and hierarchy. 
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Figure 3. Diagram of Tunisia’s post-revolution intelligence structure231 
 CONTROL AND OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE IN TUNISIA 
After the ousting of Bin Ali’s authoritarian regime, Tunisia has striven to develop a 
democratic intelligence culture. On paper, Tunisia’s democratic control over the intelligence 
agencies is the authority of official executive, legislative, and judicial institutions; in 
addition, such organizations as the media and civil society carry out informal democratic 
civilian control over the intelligence agencies.232  
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The executive branch control and oversight are accomplished by both of the NSC 
and the civilian-led Ministries of National Defense and Interior.233 The NSC is the primary 
control and oversight mechanism in the hands of the president and the prime minister. The 
NSC, through its seven committees, is tasked “with the mission to collect, study, analyze, 
and assess all information and security data”234 that pose a threat to internal state security.235 
According to Matei and Kawar, after the Tunisian democratic transition, the NSC has 
evolved into an institution that focuses on the strategic planning of security challenges to 
Tunisia’s national security rather than coordinating political policing activities.236 Both the 
Ministry of National Defense (MOD) and the Ministry of Interior (MOI) posits an organic 
control and oversight authority over their respective intelligence agencies.237 Nevertheless, 
ministerial control and oversight functions are practically ineffective due to a combination 
of MOI’s lack of transparency and resistance to independent oversight.238  
Since 2014, legislative oversight in Tunisia has been conducted through two different 
parliamentary committees, the Committee on Administrative Organization and the Affair of 
the Armed Forces (COAAFA), and the Committee on Security and Defense 
(CSD).239Among other areas of responsibilities, the COAAFA oversees the military and 
draft proposals concerning both security and military institutions. The CSD, on the other 
hand, is responsible for monitoring the functions of both the security and the military 
institution, including conducting hearings and investigations with the government officials 
regarding national security policies.240 
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The judiciary branch in Tunisia possesses the power to monitor the intelligence 
agencies’ compliance with Tunisia’s applicable legal framework, as well as hold violators of 
the legal process accountable and subject to legal consequences.241 Matei and Kawar note 
that all of the intelligence agencies’ surveillance activities have to be pre-approved “by either 
an Investigative Judge or the Prosecutor of the Republic.”242Additionally, the judicial branch 
has its own technical arm—the Technical Agency for Telecommunications—that could be 
used by the prosecution to collect electronic evidence in support of their legal 
investigations.243 
Like in Spain and Romania, the Tunisian civil society and media have assumed an 
informal control and oversight body over the intelligence and security agencies since 2011, 
after the ousting of Bin Ali’s authoritarian regime.244 Matei and Kawar note the consecutive 
laws introduced by the Tunisian government to expand and ensure free access to information. 
Matei and Kawar also indicate that the 2017 creation of an independent body to oversee the 
implementation of free access to information and networks, as stated in the 2016 law, is fully 
activated and enacted.245 Overall, Tunisia’s media and civil society had successfully 
benefited from the new free press legal framework, and established their role as an important 
stakeholder in the control and oversight mechanism over the intelligence community.  
 BACKGROUND ON INTELLIGENCE CULTURE REFORM 
The intelligence culture that existed under Bin Ali’s long rule was a culture 
dominated by secrecy, oppression, and lack of accountability. This negative culture legacy 
adversely impacted the intelligence reform process and the building of new democratic and 
supportive intelligence culture.  
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1. The Legacy of the Past: Intelligence Culture under Bin Ali 
Bin Ali’s background and experience as an intelligence professional played a 
significant role in his vision of how the state’s security and intelligence agencies were to be 
organized and function. Since Bin Ali’s rise to power following his 1987 coup, he was 
obsessed with proofing and protecting himself and his regime from any internal or external 
threats through establishing multiple layers of intelligence and security agencies under his 
direct or indirect control. However, instead of creating a single strong intelligence agency, 
Bin Ali’s regime relied on a political police system comprised of five powerful intelligence 
agencies.246 Bin Ali’s intelligence apparatus treated any imaginary or real threat to the 
regime with the utmost level of violence, oppression, and human rights abuses. Tunisia 
lacked a legal framework and any level of democratic civilian control over the intelligence 
and security institutions in order to overcome the risk of oversight and accountability over 
the abusive intelligence practices.247 In sum, Bin Ali’s approach to intelligence was based 
on promoting an intelligence culture that put the security and survival of his regime as the 
top priority, regardless of the methods and means used to achieve such an outcome.248 This 
culture has been rather difficult to uproot. 
Another legacy of Tunisia’s intelligence culture under Bin Ali’s regime is the use of 
the radical Islamic groups’ threat as a pretext for extending the regime’s grasp on all aspects 
of the Tunisian society liberties.249 For example, Jebnoun argues that the Bin Ali regime’ 
social initiatives, such as the creation of the Awakening committees, the Neighborhood 
Watch Committees, and the Watchdog Citizen, were excuses for promoting an intelligence 
culture of informers and collaborators with the main purpose of protecting the regime from 
dissidents and opposition movements.250 Overall, such practices promoted an atmosphere 
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of fear and mistrust among the Tunisian society toward their intelligence agencies in general 
and toward the regime’s depiction of radical Islamism in particular.  
In addition, Bin Ali’s regime promoted an intelligence culture of minimum 
intelligence sharing and coordination between the MOI and MOD. Bin Ali adopted a state 
policy to marginalize and weaken the armed forces because he mistrusted the military.251 
Keskes and Martin note that Bin Ali’s regime favored the Internal Security Forces (ISF) over 
the armed forces to ensure the regime’s security against any attempted military coup.252 Bin 
Ali’s authoritarian regime used the monopoly of intelligence as a tool to enable its control 
over all aspects of Tunisian society. This intelligence culture enabled the intelligence 
community to politicize and manipulate the intelligence process and outcomes.253 Evidently, 
this culture of lack of sharing and coordination persisted throughout the Tunisian democratic 
transition and the intelligence reform process and consequently reduced the effectiveness of 
the intelligence community. 
2. Early Intelligence Reform Efforts 
In the aftermath of the Tunisia revolution, the newly established, post-dictatorship 
government rushed several steps to democratize the Tunisian intelligence community and 
advance an intelligence culture of trust and effectiveness. The initial attempts to reform the 
intelligence culture showed a dichotomy between the post-dictatorship political elites, on the 
one hand, and the MOI intelligence professionals’ leading the “Intelligence Sector Reform” 
(SSR) effort on the other. For example, the political elites believed that changing Tunisia’s 
intelligence culture had to start with the transformation of its intelligence agencies. As such, 
the first step to reform Tunisia’s intelligence community was to abolish the Directorate of 
State Security (DSE)—an oppressive agency, and a critical element in Bin Ali’s political 
police apparatus— and to replace it with new intelligence services such as the National 
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Intelligence Agency in 2012, and DISA in 2015.254 Alternatively, intelligence professionals 
wanted to prioritize strengthening the intelligence agencies’ operational capacity over the 
promotion of an intelligence agency’s democratic governance, oversight functions and 
culture, due to the terrorism threats.255  
Undoubtedly, the intelligence legacy of the past attached the Tunisian intelligence 
community with Bin Ali’s authoritarian regime and political policing practices. This adverse 
culture subsequently resulted in weak intelligence capabilities against Tunisia’s external 
threats, while prompting a stigma of mistrust between the Tunisian public and their 
intelligence community.256 
Next, the government abolished the Directorate of State Security (DSE) in February 
2011 in an attempt to meet the public demands for visible reforms in the intelligence 
community. Scholars argue that the decision to abolish the DSE was premature, politically 
motivated, and did not produce the required intelligence reform since the rest of the MOI 
intelligence agencies remained unchanged.257 Additionally, the newly-created intelligence 
agencies initially struggled to adapt to the new democratic environment. For example, 
Dworkin and Malki note that the appointment of Ali Larayedh—an ex-political prisoner for 
14 years—by the newly elected Islamist Ennahda party, as the head of the MOI, among other 
political dramatic shifts, had weakened both the effectiveness and the morals of the Tunisian 
intelligence apparatus at a time when the nation needed it the most.258  
The Tunisian political elite sought to pursue a process of security sector reform to 
build and advance a new intelligence culture capable of promoting effective intelligence 
while ensuring democratic civilian control and oversight. The assembly of experts, which 
was led by Lazhar ‘Akarmi, set to provide intelligence sector reforms recommendations and 
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ideas to government and the National Constituent Assembly (NCA).259 Although never put 
to practice—due to a political vendetta between the transitional government and the newly 
elected government—the “group of experts” produced a white paper to the government that 
included reforms to strengthen the intelligence agencies’ effectiveness and operational 
capabilities, but failed to promote democratic control of intelligence properly.260Jebnoun 
argues that the white paper failure to materialize into actual democratic reforms of the 
Tunisian intelligence culture and practices was due to three main factors.261 The first was 
the experts’ narrow approach to reform based on their “over-securitization in reaction to risks 
and threats rather than a professionalization [of the security sector] seeking to align with 
international standards.”262 The second was the complex threat environment from within 
and outside of Tunisia, which augmented the NCA members’ indifferent attitude toward 
prioritizing security effectiveness over democratic oversight.263 Finally, the NCA’s 
members lacked the expertise and professionalism needed to draft suitable legislation and a 
legal framework needed to ensure democratic control and oversight over the intelligence 
agencies.264 
3. Tunisia’s Threat Environment 
Undoubtedly, the rise of the “Islamic Salafi Jihadism” threat in the MENA region 
has a significant influence over the Tunisian intelligence culture reform. Since the 1980s, 
hundreds of Tunisian fighters have traveled to join Jihadi groups in Afghanistan, Algeria, 
Libya, and Syria.265 Before the Tunisian revolution, Bin Ali’s regime and intelligence 
apparatus used the fear of domestic and transnational terrorism threat as a tool to gain more 
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influence and acceptance both domestically and internationally. At the international level, 
both the United States and European Union (EU) countries were worried and concerned 
about the threat of terrorism and illegal immigration to their national security. Bin Ali’s 
regime proposed itself as a capable and dependable partner to the international community 
in the global war on terrorism. Keskes and Martin note that the EU, although aware of 
Tunisia’s intelligence agencies’ record of human rights abuses, prioritized economic reforms 
and security coordination and cooperation over political reforms.266  
The terrorism threat persisted through and after the Tunisian revolution and transition 
to democracy. Dworkin and Malki argue that the threat of terrorism in Tunisia has evolved 
following the fallout of the Arab Spring in the Middle East in general and in Tunisia in 
particular.267 Dworkin and Malki explain that the security and political confusion and 
vacuum in Tunisia in the aftermath of the 2010 revolution allowed terrorism to revive and 
establish a strong foothold in the country.268 For example, in the aftermath of the 2010 
revolution, the Tunisian government granted amnesty to many political prisoners—including 
Salafi Jihadists—under a general pardon in 2011. In April 2011, one of the released 
prisoners—Seifallah Ben Hassine (aka Abu Iyad al-Tunisi)—along with a group of other 
amnestied-prisoners, established Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia (AST) as a Salafi political party. 
The AST took advantage of the weak intelligence agency’s institutions and culture, and 
secretly transformed into a militarized terrorist group that engaged in the killing and 
assassination of several Tunisian secular politicians and security forces both before and after 
AST’s designation as a terrorist group in August 2013.269 Overall, Bin Ali regime’s 
politicization of terrorism-related intelligence has produced a negative intelligence culture in 
                                                 
266 Keskes and Martin, “Orientalism and Binary Discursive Representations of Tunisia’s 
Democratization,” 14. 
267 Dworkin and Malki, “The Southern Front Line: EU Counter-Terrorism Cooperation with Tunisia 
and Morocco,” 4. 
268 Dworkin and Malki, 4. 
269 Dworkin and Malki, 4; Counter Extremism Project, “Ansar Al-Sharia in Tunisia (AST),” Counter 
Extremism Project, accessed February 23, 2020, https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/ansar-al-sharia-
tunisia-ast. 
58 
terms of the lack of trust between the regime and the public, which persisted through the 
democratic transition and the intelligence reform process. 
Two additional terrorism-related factors have influenced Tunisian intelligence 
culture. First, Libya’s political and security vacuum, which resulted from the ousting of the 
Gaddafi regime. The subsequent breakdown of public order in Libya provided different 
radical Islamist groups with a sanctuary and ungoverned space to train and organize.270 
Second, there was a high proportion of Tunisian foreign fighters joining jihadi groups like 
ISIS and Al-Qaeda in Syria, Iraq, and Libya. Dworkin and Malki note that as many as 3,000 
foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq have come from Tunisia. Figure 4 explains the proportion 
of foreign fighters to the national population in Muslim North African countries. Based on 
the aforementioned factors, radical jihadi groups found a suitable environment to grow and 
gain support within post-revolution Tunisian society, taking advantage of the initial security 
and political vacuum and the existing negative intelligence culture, which lacked public trust 
and support. Figure 4 explains that Tunisia’s population of 11.4 million people contributed 
around 3,000 foreign fighters, which was more than the total number of Morocco and 
Algeria’s number of foreign fighters combined, even though the two nations have a national 
population of more than 76 million.  
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Figure 4. Numbers of foreign fighters versus the national population of 
Muslim North African countries271  
4. The 2015 Terrorist Attacks as Catalysts for Reform 
The terrorist attacks of 2015 in Tunis and Souse revealed severe intelligence and 
security failures. Jebnoun describes the 2015 terrorist attacks as an international and public 
embarrassment of both Tunisia’s political leadership and intelligence services for their lack 
of ability to deal with the country’s growing terrorist threats.272 Dworkin and Malki observe 
that the security services failed to coordinate their efforts before and in response to the 
terrorist attacks, in addition to their failure to control the militants’ movements across the 
                                                 
271 Dworkin and Malki, 5. 
272 Jebnoun, “Tunisia’s National Intelligence Why ‘Rogue Elephants’ Fail to Reform,” 61. 
60 
Tunisian-Libyan borders.273 Nevertheless, the 2015 terrorist attacks induced an intelligence 
reform process aimed at restructuring Tunisia’s intelligence agencies and addressing the 
vulnerabilities behind the 2015 intelligence and security failures.274 The main priority for 
Tunisia’s political elites was to improve the intelligence’s effectiveness in the fight against 
terrorism. The political elites decided to include and strengthen the armed forces’ role in the 
collective intelligence and security effort in fighting terrorism by creating DISA and the 
National Commission on Counter-Terrorism in 2015. Nevertheless, Matei and Kawar argue 
that DISA’S legal framework lacked the precision of language to define terms like “potential 
threats,” as well as the absence of any legislative effort in the creation of the new agency and 
its legal framework.275 Matei and Kawar continue to point out that the absence of legislative 
inputs into the creation process resulted in a lack of “clear legislative framework or oversight 
to ensure transparency and accountability in military intelligence activities.”276  
In the years following the 2015 terrorist attacks, Tunisian political leadership 
presented multiple initiatives to reform some of the existing intelligence agencies and create 
new ones in order to improve the intelligence community’s ability to perform its domestic 
counterterrorism tasks effectively and cooperate with the regional and international 
intelligence agencies in the global war on terrorism.277 
At the institutional level, the Tunisian government started a reform process of the 
National Intelligence Agency in December 2016, followed by the creation of the National 
Intelligence Fusion Center in early 2017. Both of these organizational reforms were mainly 
focused on promoting an intelligence culture of sharing and cooperation among the different 
intelligence agencies.278 
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After the 2015 terrorist attacks and as part of the Tunisian intelligence reform 
process, the political leadership were interested in partnering with other international 
intelligence agencies and security organizations in order to boost Tunisia’s chances to access 
training, equipment, and funds needed to fight terrorism and guarantee national security and 
safety.279 For example, Matei and Kawar argue that the intended NATO Intelligence Fusion 
Center in Tunisia would help in promoting a culture of sharing and cooperation within the 
national intelligence community while also improving intelligence analytical products.280 
Nonetheless, Jebnoun argues that the international intelligence involvement at the 
operational and tactical level had enabled informal arrangements that would undermine the 
democratic control and oversight of the intelligence agencies.281 
5. Persisting Challenges to Intelligence Culture Reforms 
Tunisia has achieved remarkable advancements in its intelligence reform process. 
Nevertheless, intelligence culture reform could not achieve the required balance between 
intelligence effectiveness and democratic control and oversight. Scholars identified three 
main factors which contributed to obstructing the progress of intelligence culture reform.282 
The first was the upsurge in Salafi-Jihadist terrorist threats in the years following the Tunisian 
revolution.283 According to Dworkin and Malki, many of the Tunisian political elites believe 
that transparency and accountability are counterproductive to practical counterterrorism 
efforts.284 This challenge has to led the political elites to prioritize modernizing and 
strengthening the intelligence operations and functions over building a culture of civilian 
control, oversight, and accountability. The second factor is the intelligence’s legacy of the 
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past. The Tunisian public associates the intelligence agencies with Bin Ali’s regime’s 
oppressive political policing practices. Subsequently, the prevailing intelligence culture was 
a culture of mistrust, secrecy, and lack of accountability on the part of the intelligence 
agencies.285 As a result of this stigma, the intelligence community faced a recruitment 
dilemma. The intelligence community was unable to attract enough new and suitable recruits 
to fill post-authoritarian intelligence positions, resulting in the intelligence community’s 
resolve to keep the pre-revolution intelligence personnel.286 Furthermore, as a result of 
keeping the old regime’s intelligence personnel to staff and command the new intelligence 
agencies, they continued to use old political policing practices.287 As a result, such practices 
would impede the advancement of an intelligence culture of openness and trust between the 
public and the intelligence apparatus. The third factor was the political elites’ lack of interest 
and expertise in building a democratic and effective intelligence culture. This was because 
the political elites were either associated with the old regime’s structure and practices, or 
because they simply lacked the needed knowledge to develop a democratic legal framework 
and a culture of civilian control and oversight. Keskes and Martin argue that the Tunisian 
revolution failed to generate a clear separation from the old regime’s legacy institutions and 
practices, they explain that Bin Ali’s former regime officials and party members continued 
to be part of the post-revolution political elite class.288 On the same note, Matei and Kawar, 
as well as Jebnoun, argue that, post revolution, political elites’ lack of intelligence expertise 
and knowledge were central to the Tunisian authority’s failure to produce adequate 
intelligence-related legislation, and subsequently to implement democratic civilian oversight 
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over intelligence activities.289 As a result, Tunisia’s current intelligence apparatus is 
shrouded by a lack of transparency regarding its structure, operations, and budget.  
 CONCLUSION 
Although a relatively new democracy—less than 20 years old—and located in a 
turbulent region that is infected with political instability and terrorism, Tunisia has managed 
to achieve considerable democratization progress.290 Tunisia’s intelligence reform was a 
result of public demand to liberate the country from Bin Ali’s authoritarian regime and 
intrusive intelligence practices. Nevertheless, Keskes and Martin insist that “the revolution 
did not produce a clean break from the institutional foundations of the authoritarian regime, 
thus making the transition process complex and non-linear.”291 The political elites failed to 
separate themselves entirely from the authoritarian era’s institutions and practices. Although 
the security threats of the radical Islamic groups are real and existential, the old guards in 
both the intelligence community and the political scene used the threat of terrorism as an 
excuse to push back against intelligence culture reforms and install democratic civilian 
control and oversight over the intelligence community. Obviously, Tunisia’s democratic 
transition remains in the early stages of the development process and Tunisia intelligence 
culture reform is still in the building phase, and would benefit from criticism and guidance 
to keep the reform process moving forward.  
Concerning the area of democratic control, the political elites created several 
initiatives to instill a legal framework, formal oversight mechanisms and a civilian-led 
institutions.292 Nevertheless, the intelligence agencies still lack clear and well-defined rules 
and structures, thus complicating the task of effective institutional control mechanisms.293 
For example, the lack of a robust legal framework has allowed intelligence agencies’ abusive 
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practices to go unpunished.294 The result would be adverse to an intelligence culture of 
transparency and accountability. 
Similarly, intelligence effectiveness is still an area of concern that requires further 
improvements and reforms. The political elites attempted to provide clear strategic guidance 
for the intelligence community, and create an intelligence culture of sharing and cooperation 
among different intelligence and security stakeholders.295 Nevertheless, the political elites 
lacked the required expertise and desire to provide a comprehensive strategic vision to the 
rules and limits of the intelligence agencies within the newly established democratic 
institutions.296 Equally, the intelligence culture’s legacies of the past—especially the culture 
of secrecy and lack of coordination—have persisted through the democratic transition 
process, leading to the lack of any credible attempts to promote a new culture of sharing and 
coordination between the different intelligence players, especially within the MOI.  
On the whole, Tunisia’s intelligence is growing more effective in its fight against 
terrorism. However, the intelligence culture reform is still a work in progress. The political 
elites—with the help and scrutiny of the international community—must recognize the 
importance of finding a suitable trade-off between secrecy and democratic control over the 
intelligence agencies.297 Areas like the intelligence agencies’ transparent structure, rules, 
and legal framework, as well as the need to educate both the intelligence professionals and 
the elites about the requirements of a democratic intelligence culture in consolidating 
democracies, would definitely facilitate building a thriving intelligence culture in Tunisia. 
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V. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
This thesis sought to assess and evaluate the experience of three new democracies 
against existing literature with regard to the intelligence culture reform processes. The three 
cases discussed in this study (Spain, Romania, and Tunisia) share an authoritarian past 
before they transitioned to democracy. The three countries have undergone democratic 
reforms of intelligence agencies, which included attempts to bring about a democratic 
intelligence culture. However, it is essential to acknowledge that the three cases happened 
in different threat environments, and each country had different levels of external support 
for its reform process, as well as a different duration of the democratic transition process. 
Indeed, the differences among these three cases are examples to understand that each 
reform process is unique and requires comprehensive understanding of the conditions and 
constraints surrounding the democratic transition time and duration. 
Nevertheless, each of the cases mentioned above represents a unique story of why 
and how each country pursued its unique path to develop an intelligence culture that is 
supportive of its intelligence organizations, roles, and practices.  
This chapter will provide the overall findings and conclusions of this research. It 
will start with a comparative analysis of the three countries, using four distinctive themes 
of intelligence culture which are: openness, democratic civilian oversight, reforms of 
institutions and legal framework, and effectiveness. This framework of analysis is rooted 
on Matei’s analytical framework for assessment of Romania’s intelligence reform.298 The 
themes used for this chapter have emerged while comparing the main factors influencing 
the intelligence culture reform process in each of the case studies. The themes discussed in 
this chapter are only examples of the different components and moving parts of the 
intelligence culture that need to be carefully addressed in order to achieve the desired 
reform results. The ranking of each theme is based on how well each case has performed 
against each theme, where a high score represents a high level of conformity to democratic 
culture values, and a low score represents a low level of reform outcome.  
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A. ANALYSIS OF THE THREE CASE STUDIES 
This section will attempt to assess and evaluate each of the three cases against the 
four themes proposed by this thesis. For this purpose, the rating criteria will build on 
Bruneau and Matei’s metrics example.299 Each country will be rated high, medium, or low 
depending on its level of compliance with the democratic values against each category. For 
example, high will mean that country has achieved full compliance with the proposed 
theme. Medium would refer to marginal or inconsistent compliance with the democratic 
values of that theme. Finally, low would mean that country lacked visible improvement or 
compliance with that relevant theme. Table 1 represents the three case studies’ performance 
against the four suggested themes of this thesis. 
Table 1. Themes for comparing intelligence culture reforms 
 Theme 







Spain High Medium/High High High 
Romania High High High High 
Tunisia Low Low Low Medium 
 
1. Openness and Transparency 
In pursuit for a culture of openness and transparency, Spain, Romania, and Tunisia 
have endeavored to accomplish the following objectives. First, they have striven to abolish 
the intelligence agencies of the past and establish new intelligence apparatuses that would 
uphold the principles of openness and transparency and satisfy the public demands to 
visible reforms and trust in the new democracy. Second, these countries have used 
education as a tool to promote the values of openness and transparency between the 
intelligence community and civil society. Spain and Romania scored high in this category, 
while Tunisia scored low. Indeed, Spain and Romania have accomplished considerable 
progress in establishing a culture of openness and transparency by utilizing education to 
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facilitate an open line of cooperation and interaction, in addition to the political elites’ 
successful efforts to reform the intelligence community from the culture of secrecy. Tunisia 
is lagging behind due to a combination of a legacy of the past (a persistent culture of 
secrecy surrounding the intelligence agencies’ culture and practices), and limited political 
will (minimal initiatives that effectively promote openness and transparency, like 
education). 
Indeed, both Spain and Romania established education projects and partnership 
programs between the intelligence community and academia in general and universities in 
particular. Such educational initiatives provided the intelligence agencies with a valuable 
source of expertise to augment its analytical capabilities on the one hand and promote an 
atmosphere of trust between the intelligence community and civil society on the other. 
Alternatively, Tunisia prioritized security effectiveness over the pursuit of openness 
mainly due to Tunisia’s  internal and external complex threat environment.300 
Additionally, Tunisia fell short in bridging the trust gap between its public and the 
intelligence community, leading to a persistent atmosphere of mistrust and a lack of 
transparency.  
2. Democratic Civilian Oversight 
Both Spain and Romania scored medium/high in the parliamentary and civilian 
oversight category, while Tunisia scored low. As such, both Spain and Romania adopted 
comprehensive legal frameworks that established the oversight prerogatives for civilian 
and parliamentary institutions, and granted civilian and parliamentary officials access to 
intelligence secret missions and practices (more in Romania than in Spain). Second, an 
active and productive media and civil society ensured continuous parliamentary and 
civilian oversight. Third, the educational initiatives boosted the political elites’ expertise 
and knowledge to perform their oversight duties effectively. Nevertheless, two main factors 
challenged Spain, Romania, and Tunisia’s attempts to advance the principle of 
parliamentary and civilian oversight: political elites’ lack of interest and desire to pursue 
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such democratic mechanisms, and the political elites’ lack of knowledge and expertise to 
perform proper oversight functions. 
Tunisia scored low in the oversight category for two main reasons. First, the 
Tunisian elite prioritized modernizing and strengthening the intelligence operation in favor 
of building a proper oversight legal framework and function. Second, political elites lacked 
the required expertise and knowledge to develop a democratic framework and culture of 
civilian and parliamentary oversight.  
In sum, the political elites hold the main responsibility in establishing principles of 
parliamentary and civilian oversight for the new democratic intelligence community. Such 
principles require the political elites’ knowledge and will in the principles and methods of 
creating the needed legal framework that would ensure such principles are held and 
respected by the intelligence community and observed by the legislative and judicial arms 
of the government. 
3. Reforms of Institutions and Legal Framework 
Spain and Romania scored high in the category of reforming the legal framework 
and building democratic institutions’ category, while Tunisia scored low in reforming its 
institutions and legal framework due to the persistence of the old authoritarian regime 
institutions and practices. Tunisia’s threat environment and the political elites’ lack of 
interest and expertise resulted in a vague and incomprehensive legal framework and the 
persistence of using the institutions and practices of the old regime’s security apparatus.  
The three cases represent a significant example for the centrality of establishing and 
reforming the existing legal framework and building new democratic institutions, to the 
other essential domains of intelligence culture like civilian oversight, control, and 
accountability. Spain, Romania, and Tunisia rushed their intelligence reforms because of 
the new political elites’ desire to swiftly satisfy the public demands for visible reforms, and 
demonstrate their commitment for reforms to the international community and media. 
However, the new political elites did not have the required expertise and knowledge to 
build new democratic institutions, and construct a comprehensive legal framework that 
clearly defined the intelligence agencies mandates, and established well-defined rules and 
69 
regulations that would govern democratic civilian control, legislative oversight, and 
judicial accountability of the intelligence agencies within the new democracy. 
The newly elected political elites in the three cases desired to step away from the 
old intelligence structure and establish a new intelligence apparatus that would conform to 
the new democratic values of the nation. Romania and Tunisia were expeditious in 
abolishing the existing intelligence agency and establishing new intelligence agencies 
because that would give a visible signal for their respective civil societies of their 
commitment to the reform process. However, Spain was initially more conservative than 
Romania and Tunisia in its approach to the intelligence reforms due to the great influence 
of Spain’s armed forces over Spain’s political elites. For example, after Spain’s democratic 
transition in 1975, it took the new democratic government two years to create the CESID 
due to Spain’s unique political and historical context regarding the significant role and 
influence of its armed forces on the political scene. Nevertheless, Spain and Romania 
eventually were more successful than Tunisia in distancing the intelligence community 
from the past culture of secrecy and establishing a new institutions and intelligence 
professionals that comply with the principles of openness and transparency.  
In sum, reforming the legal intelligence framework and building new democratic 
institutions requires time to acquire the needed expertise and knowledge, as well as the 
assistance and support of the international democratic community to fill the knowledge gap 
and to provide an incentive for political elites in the reform process. 
4. Effective Intelligence Agencies 
Spain and Romania scored high in the effectiveness category while Tunisia scored 
medium due to two main reasons. First, Spain and Romania established successful 
educational initiatives between academia and the intelligence community through the CNI 
in Spain and the ANI in Romania. These academic partnership programs enhanced the 
analytical capabilities of the intelligence professionals as well as provided the intelligence 
community with a pool of experts to augment the intelligence agencies with a variety of 
subject matter experts when needed to face new challenges and threats. Second, the 
creation of national coordination centers—like the CNI in Romania, and the CNI and 
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CNCA in Spain—were an example of the political elites’ desire to create a culture of 
cooperation and sharing among the different intelligence actors, as well as to establish a 
sharing and coordination vehicle with other democracies and partners. Tunisia scored 
medium in the field of effectiveness mainly due to the political elites’ lack of adequate 
expertise to provide clear strategic vision for the intelligence community, which resulted 
in a weak culture of sharing and coordination between the different intelligence players, 
and especially within the MOI. Nevertheless, Tunisia, like Spain and Romania’s 
intelligence communities, gained more capabilities through partnering with the 
international intelligence community in terms of securing access to training, funds, and 
resources, which ultimately enhanced the intelligence services’ capabilities to handle 
existing and future threats and challenges. 
Spain, Romania, and Tunisia had to overcome three main challenges—inherited 
from their previous non-democratic regimes—in their path for developing an effective and 
efficient intelligence culture. First, there was the prevailing culture of “turf wars” and 
competition among the different components of the state intelligence community, like 
gaining the approval and praise of the rulers or because the ruling regime benefitted from 
a divided intelligence community to ensure its survival. Second, there was the politicization 
of the intelligence process by the ruling regimes. The ruling regimes of the past in Spain, 
Romania, and Tunisia prioritized intelligence functions that would serve their survival over 
improving the intelligence capabilities and interagency coordination. Third, there was a 
lack of professionalism within the intelligence community due to weak training, education, 
and programs, as well as the lack of cooperation with other international intelligence 
agencies. 
In sum, the political elites’ vision and guidance to the intelligence community, as 
well as creating new education and coordination institutions and international support, are 
all essential components for building an intelligence culture of professionalism, 
effectiveness and information sharing.  
Overall, the first three themes of this analysis—openness and transparency, 
democratic civilian oversight, and institutions and legal framework—have shown more 
successful intelligence culture reforms in the cases of Spain and Romania in comparison 
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to Tunisia. The main reasons for this variation are: first, that the political elites gave priority 
to strengthening the intelligence agencies’ effectiveness and capabilities over other aspects 
of building a democratic intelligence culture, due to a more complex and challenging threat 
environment; second, the political elites’ lack of adequate knowledge and expertise in 
building new democratic institutions; and third, the persistent culture of secrecy and 
resistance to reforms from the old regimes’ guards within the intelligence agencies and the 
political parties. However, all of the cases have shown relatively successful reform with 
regard to the intelligence effectiveness theme, mainly because of the international support 
initiatives in providing training, education, and capabilities for the three cases of this study. 
 FINDINGS AND HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
The three countries studied in this thesis reveal that at the center of successful 
intelligence culture reforms is that achieving a delicate balance between the 
democratization of intelligence and achieving effective and efficient intelligence functions 
is a paramount.301 
This thesis finds that Spain, Romania, and Tunisia have experienced various levels 
of progress in developing an intelligence culture that supported their intelligence 
organizations, roles, and practices, with Spain and Romania more advanced than Tunisia. 
Although each case has achieved a different level of reforms, successful intelligence 
culture reforms is significant for the new consolidation democracy for two main reasons. 
First, the consolidating democracy will benefit from reliable and robust intelligence 
agencies to ensure national security during the critical times of vulnerable transition. 
Second, the new democracies would benefit from the culture of openness and information 
sharing to educate and train its political elites and prepare the new democracy to be a 
competent partner to other democracies in the global security efforts. 
This thesis hypothesized that the path to achieve and maintain a balance between 
the intelligence services’ democratization and effectiveness has to go through a collective 
institutional effort under the umbrella of a legislative body to update the existing “obsolete” 
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legal frameworks to be in line with democratic intelligence functions, provide a clear 
security mandate, ensure parliamentary accountability and judicial oversight, ensure 
competent political guidance for the national intelligence strategies and doctrine, foster a 
culture of information sharing and timely access to information among the different 
intelligence agencies, and allocate enough funds and resources for the intelligence structure 
to deliver practical training and operational outcomes regarding the conceptual framework 
for intelligence culture to be used by consolidating democracies. 
Based on the findings of the three case studies, the initial hypothesis stands correct, 
as it represented all the aspects that need to be addressed by the consolidating democracies 
to achieve the required balance between democratization and effectiveness. Nevertheless, 
two additional factors have to be considered based on Spain, Romania, and Tunisia’s 
intelligence culture reform experiences. First, the political elites of the new democracy 
need to gain knowledge and experience to build democratic intelligence institutions and 
establish a comprehensive legal framework. Second, balanced international support, 
through partnership and cooperation programs, is critical to provide incentives and support 
for the political elites’ appetite for pursuing a balanced intelligence culture reform process 
even amid complex threat environments and pushback from the intelligence and security 
sectors (as in the case of Tunisia).  
 RECOMMENDATIONS OF A MODEL TO REFORM INTELLIGENCE 
CULTURE IN CONSOLIDATING DEMOCRACIES 
The model suggested by this thesis will build on Chiru’s “Multilevel Model of 
Analysis of Intelligence Culture”302 and capitalize on the findings and observations of this 
study to provide consolidating democracies with a road map for intelligence culture 
reforms. This model’s focus is to address some of the factors that make each reform process 
different and explain why some consolidating democracies achieve more success than 
others. 
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1. Key Factors in Shaping Intelligence Culture Reform 
A model for building a democratic intelligence culture based on this thesis’s 
hypothesis and findings should accommodate several factors for the model to apply to a 
broader range of democratic transition scenarios. 
a. Considering the Perception of Society as a Whole 
The new political elites and the intelligence professionals in any transitioning 
democracy should consider the perceptions of society of the intelligence sector’s past 
practices and values, and identify and acknowledge intelligence has induced myths and 
traumas of the past as a prerequisite to promote an atmosphere of openness and 
transparency between the new intelligence agencies and citizens, in order to replace the 
myths with facts and mistrust with trust. Additionally, the recognition of the public 
collective memory and perceptions of the past should boost the political elites and the 
intelligence professionals’ effort to generate a clear separation from the old regime’s legacy 
institutions and practices and replace them with new democratic institutions and practices. 
To achieve this end, the intelligence community would need to manage its culture of 
secrecy through adopting partnership programs with academia and civil society; 
subsequently, such initiatives would allow the intelligence services to promote and manage 
a culture of openness and accountability.  
b. The Level of the External Support  
The political elites in new democracies face the dilemma of reform priorities, where 
building a new democratic intelligence culture could fall behind for a variety of reasons 
like the pushback from the intelligence community’s old guards or corrupt politicians. 
External support, in terms providing incentives for the new political elites in the form of 
what Matei describes as sticks and carrots,303 would persuade the political elites to adopt 
more rigorous reforms, especially if the incentives included recommended policies and a 
road map to both guide and supervise the reform process. For example, in Romania, the 
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incentives of joining NATO and the EU had a significant influence over the Romanian 
political elite’s desire to follow through with the requirement of building a balanced 
intelligence culture that adheres to democratic norms and values. However, external 
support in the case of Tunisia falls short of persuading the Tunisian political elites and 
intelligence professionals to bridge the reform gap in the areas of openness, civilian control 
and oversight. Moreover, instead, external support was primarily directed toward 
maintaining effective intelligence functions to assist the international efforts in fighting 
terrorism.  
In sum, the international democratic community has an important role to play in 
supporting new and consolidating democracies by providing expertise, training, and, most 
importantly, financial aid in order to motivate the new political elite to reform all the 
different aspects of building a balanced and democratic intelligence culture. 
c. Consider the Threat Environment 
New democracies initially go through a period of weakness and vulnerability 
following the fall of the existing regime’s intelligence and security apparatus. The lack of 
adequate knowledge and expertise among the new political elites in the new democracies 
could lead to reforms that might overlook the importance of regaining effective intelligence 
capabilities. The complexity of the threat environment has a significant influence over the 
political elites’ appetite to follow through the intelligence culture reforms and provide the 
intelligence agencies with the support to fulfill their mission and contribute to the safety 
and security of the nation. For example, the 3/11 terrorist attack in Spain was the reason 
for a variety of initiatives taken by Spain’s political elites to ensure intelligence readiness 
and effectiveness to face any future threats to Spain’s national security.304 However, the 
complex threat environment in Tunisia was a hindrance to the intelligence culture reform 
process. Unlike Spain and Romania, Tunisia was faced with a complex threat environment 
early in its democratization process, which gave the old guards in the intelligence services 
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leverage over the political elites to stall intelligence culture reforms regarding the areas of 
openness and civilian control and oversight. 
2. A Model for Intelligence Culture Reform in Consolidating Democracies 
Each intelligence culture reform process is different and depends on a variety of 
factors unique to each case. As a minimum, any reform process has to consider four 
important factors before starting the intelligence culture reform process. First, there is the 
perception of society within the broader historical context of the new democracy. Second, 
there is the external support for the democratic transformation of the intelligence culture. 
Third, there is the threat environment, which has to be seen within a broader geopolitical 
framework. Fourth, there is the political elites’ knowledge and expertise, as well as their 
desire to take on the challenging task of building a new and democratic intelligence culture. 
Subsequently, the new political elites would need a collective institutional effort to 
direct and supervise the intelligence culture reform process. The institutional approach to 
culture reform would ensure a consistent and balanced trade-off between the democratic 
values of the intelligence community and maintaining intelligence effectiveness. For 
example, the creation of a control body like a “high committee” to administer the different 
aspects of the reform processlegal framework, legislative and judicial oversight, civilian 
control mechanisms, and intelligence effectiveness’ measureswould ensure a complete 
and balanced reform project. Initiatives like partnership programs between academia and 
the intelligence community would advertise a culture of openness and sharing on the one 
hand, while providing the new democracies with knowledge and expertise to sustain 
democratic and effective intelligence apparatus. Based on these research findings, Figure 
5 illustrates this thesis’s suggested model for intelligence culture reform, with emphasis on 
the factors affecting and influencing each phase of the reform process.  
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Figure 5. Intelligence culture model 
As Figure 5 illustrates, there are three main phases for the intelligence culture 
reform process. The first phase represents some of the main factors that dictate intelligence 
culture reform following the democratic transition. The second phase represents the main 
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factors which have an influence over the political elites’ ability and desire to pursue the 
reforms. The third phase illustrates a suggested approach by the political elites for a 
balanced and institutional reform process of intelligence culture, with emphasis on 
establishing intelligence and civil society partnership programs. This model, among others, 
has a potential value in providing the political elites with a road map to consider while they 
gain more knowledge and skills throughout the democratic consolidation and intelligence 
culture reform process. 
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